Empirical Research On The Influence Of Two Types Of Agency Conflicts On R&D Investment

Advances in science and technology are the main driving force of economic and socialdevelopment. Enterprises pay a lot of attention to R&D activities. However, because of thelack of neutrality and development, R&D investment in China is still lagging far behinddeveloped countries, resulting in weaker innovation capability of enterprises.While domesticand foreign scholars have undertaken a significant amount of research on the factor of R&Dinvestment in this context, in-depth studies on the factors of agency conflict are still rare. Thisarticle is aimed at filling this gap and explores the influence of two types of agency conflictson R&D investment from this point of view.Firstly, this dissertation review the agency problem and corporate governance researchliterature, and the relationship between corporate governance and R&D spending. However,research about the effects of enterprise R&D investment from the perspective of agencyconflicts and cycle is rare. Proceeding from this understanding, this article explores the impactof agency conflict and cycle on R&D.Secondly, based on agency theory, information asymmetry theory, the analysis of theindustry life cycle theory, this dissertation elaborate on the impact of conflicts andcharacteristics in different industry life cycles in enterprise R&D investment. In doing so, thisdissertation construct the enterprise life cycle and the basic theoretical framework of agencyconflicts affecting enterprise technology innovation and R&D. From the basis of thistheoretical analysis, this dissertation put forward research hypothesis.Thirdly, in the empirical research, this dissertation uses2012-2013data from A-sharelisted companies as research samples. In terms of variables, R&D intensity is used as adependent variable; management incentive factors as the first class agent conflict ofsubstitution variables; and ownership concentration and equity balance degree as substitutionvariables of the second type of agency conflict. Model1is used to inspect the relationshipbeween agency conflicts and the R&D. Thereafter, this dissertation add virtual variable ofcycle and its interaction with the agency conflict variables into Model2and Model3to verifythe influence of cycle.Finally, through theoretical analysis and empirical test, this paper mainly arrives at the following research conclusions: executive compensation and equity incentive are positivelylinked to R&D investment; equity balance degree is positively linked to the intensity of R&Dinvestment, while equity concentration are negatively related to R&D; the industry in thegrowth stage has smaller agency conflict and more R&D investment, while the industry in themature and recessionary stages have larger conflict and less R&D investment; the cycle factorplays a regulatory role in the relationship between the agency conflicts and the R&Dinvestment.