Research On Longitudinal R&D Cooperation Behavior Of Enterprises Under Vertical Spillover

In the background of the country drive to strengthen the independent innovationcapability, and the market trends of increasing demands of enterprise’s innovation caused byshorter product and technology cycles, technological innovation will become the corecompetiticeness of enterprises, and direct way to achieve technological innocation is thecontinuous development of new prosucts. Nowadays，most exprises choose to cooperate withother companies to carry out R&D, in order to reduce R&D risks, get technology upgradesand achieve the maximum profit and advantage of the overall enterprise.Because of horizontal R&D cooperation is easy to generate the problem of moralhazard when sharing innovations, longitudinal R&D with its higher innovation efficiency,cooperation stability and the level of profits earned more enterprises’ attention. During theprocess of vertical cooperation will inevitably produce some spillover effect, one part of thechain of innovation will give its partners bring profits, this effect will have a correspondingimpact on bilateral cooperation relations. In addition, with different subsidy policy in thegovernment, vertical R&D mode will also demonstrate different models and differentselection results.Therefore, from the perspective of management science, using mathematicalmodeling,game theory, and comparative analysis, this paper has explored the behaviors of longitudinalR&D enterprises under vertical spillovers. Firstly, on the basis of reviewing previous relatedliteratures about R&D cooperation, vertical spillover and subsidies, scenarios anda basic model were proposed. Secondly, based on three different government subsidiesbackground, under the condition of existing vertical spillover, this paper explored the gamebehaviors of the R&D enterprises under four conditions named no coordination mechanism,coordination mechanisms, cooperative games and social welfare maximization, trying toidentify the optimal decision of enterprises under different modes. Then, according to theoptimal decision results for each state model, we analyzed the influence of vertical spilloverlevel of optimal decision results and compared them; sort results of each state under eachoptimal decision variables were obtained. Finally, numerical simulation methods were usedto test the theoretical conclusions of this study.Through this paper’s theoretical research, we can find the different relationships ofvertical spillover and optimal decision results under different cooperative states and thedegree of it’s’ effects. Thus, by using theoretical results can we guide the enterprises’s innovation and provide reference for enterprise innovation decision-making behavious,especially for the large integration industries.