Research On The Subsidy Policy Of New Energy Vehicles Based On Game Theory

Under the background of global warming,China's oil crisis and increasingly serious pollution,the development of new energy vehicles has become the consensus of the development of the automotive industry.Since 2010,China has invested a lot of manpower,material and financial resources in the development of new energy automotive industry.The new energy automotive industry has made rapid progress with the support of the government.However,with the rapid development of automobile industry,it brought a series of problems,such as infrastructure construction,new energy vehicles cheat up problems.These problems have hindered the development of new energy vehicles to a certain extent.Based on the new energy vehicles subsidy policy as the main research object,firstly this essay discussed the necessity of subsidies for new energy vehicles from the view of external point.According to industry life cycle theory,the subsidy was divided into the import market of the subsidy policy and the rapid growth of the subsidy policy.During the period of import market,we mainly considered the impact of government subsidies to enterprises decision under complete information.We also discussed that the enterprise will not put all resources for the production of new energy vehicles due to precipitation of high cost,innovation and other reasons.In the fast growth stage,this paper mainly discusses the new energy vehicles subsidy fraud problem.Through the establishment of dynamic game of incomplete information,we concluded that the defrauding the subsidy is mainly caused by the asymmetric information of both sides and the high subsidy of the government.We have also put forward that the government should perfect the subsidy mechanism,increase the punishment.Taking stage investigation of enterprises will encourage enterprises to a greater probability of true.In addition,this paper also analyzes that the government should consider the influence of consumer behavior on the automobile manufacturers' decision making when the quality subsidy is adopted.Then,this paper made a detailed analysis of the problem of the new energy vehicle fraud and supplement.Firstly,it introduced the devolopment of new energy vehicles,which leads to the phenomenon and causes of defrauding the subsidy.Then we analyze the specific behavior of the car company's fraud,including the licensing without cars,the lack of electricity,the inconsistent logo and the idle vehicles.After that,the paper discussed the specific reasons of the new energy vehicle fraud,including the excessive subsidies,the low threshold of new energy vehicle production,the lack of local government supervision,the lack of R&D capability and the lack of integrity in business.Then it analyzed the punishment of the government on the fraud and the enterprises also rectify the internal enterprise after receiving the punishment from the government.Finally,according to the questions found from the research,we presented that the government should increase supervision,ease the intensity of subsidy fall and strengthen the infrastructure construction.