A Study On Adjustment And Regulation Measures Of Industrial Land Use Change In Yiwu

Along with the rapid development of economy, the steady progress of urbanization and the continuous improvement of the urban infrastructure, locational conditions within certain section of the industrial land have significantly improved. To earn huge profit margin, industrial land owner either altered its utility as a business services or rent, selt, and this kind of phenomenon existed in the city. On the one hand, to some extent this kind of behavior caused a huge loss of state-owned assets, and damaged the layout of the city; However, on the other hand, this phenomenon also perfected the urban functions. Thus to explore the disposal of industrial land use change counter-measures of this phenomenon is of great significance.On the basis of the comparison and analysis of the map of Yiwu region overall plan and current map, this paper got changes on the spatial distribution characteristics of industrial land of Yiwu. Then summarized the driving factors of Yiwu industrial use changes:economic interests, supervision and the absence of law, and lack of planning prospective. For changes caused by the first two, this paper constructed the entrust-agent game model and transfer model, KMRW reputation model, supervision game model, analyzed the conflicts of interest and behavior tendency of the stakeholders in industrial land use change, found the measures to control the change of industrial land use. To cause changes in the latter case, this paper advised to accelerate the pace of Yiwu industrial land adjustment, gradually improved the urban functions. At the same time, the paper explored the principle and model of replacement, tried to provided policy guidance and advice for the future of the industrial land adjustment work in Yiwu.The main conclusion of this paper was as follows:the government interests between target inconsistency, information asymmetry, the appraisal difficulties and constraint softening of central government to local governments caused the local government to lack of reasonable use of industrial land based on the perspective of entrust-agent theory. For these reasons, this paper put forward the corresponding countermeasures. Through building and analysing the assignment game model, KMRW reputation model, and the supervision game model, this paper found that attracted more excellent developers to participate in the purchase of industrial land, guarded against the "conspiracy", intensified punishment to change behavior, increased land regulators earnings, reduced the regulatory costs, and improved the understanding of the social damage change measures can reduce the purpose of profitspace, thereby limited the behavior. At the same time, completed and reasonable replacement model should include:organized replacement work well, fair compensation for the interests of the replacement unit, redevelopment of land replacement scientificly, the system guarantee of the replacement of land.