| The fist public auction of a state-owned land use right was happened in Shenzhen city in December1987, this auction was the first time the land use right was brought into the market as assets after the founding of new China, which meant that the land was brought into the market as a commodity, and announced the creation of the land market. After that, the way of agreement selling occupied the dominant position of the state-owned land selling mode in a long period of time. Due to the agreement selling mode was the low market-oriented way to trade, combined with too much free discretion of the local government at all levels, this agreement selling made the frequent rent-seeking and corruption, caused huge loss of the state-owned land assets, seriously restricted the healthy development of land market; the harm was great. In order to change this situation, to create a fair open land market, regulate the behavior of the selling of state-owned land, obtain normal marketization of land revenue, on May9,2002, the ministry of land and resources issued the order 《the provision that state-owned land use right must be sold through bidding, auction and listing》.Then in March2004, ministry of land and resources, ministry of supervision jointly issued 《the notice that the supervisory work of the business land use right’s selling through bidding, auction and listing must be continued》. demanding that from August31of the year2004. all the profit-oriented land must be sold through public bidding, auction and listing, this means the provision was implemented throughout the country.Then on September28,2007, on the basis of legal principle of property law and other relevant laws and regulations, the ministry of land and resources issued39th dictate 《the provision is that the state-owned construction land use right must be sold through bidding, auction and listing》. These will help the further development of land market. This land bidding auction listing system brought the following effection, optimizing the allocation of land resources, manifesting the normal market value of the land; and the local government’s land selling income was growing, and then the land selling revenue’s maximization economic benefits was fully revealed, so "land finance effect "was gradually alienated to all levels of local governments goal. In order to get higher land selling income, the auction and listing which meant the man who gave the highest price would have the land were widely used by the local government; so the land price was improved to a high level, and the real estate price was also triggered to rise in a quick irrational way. Fully realizing the seriousness of these problems, the central committee of the communist party of China and the state council have been making the control. Facing the increasingly serious situation of the land price and housing price, the CPC central committee and the state council issued a strong series of control measures from the year2010, such as resonably considering the land supply way and supply content, exploring land comprehensive evaluation method;requiring clearly that the system of land’s bidding auction listing must be continued,at the same time the "comprehensive assessment","one-bid","two-way bidding" selling mode must be explored too. Central government’s regulation goal is to perfect the land selling system furtherly, modify the current market selling mode of the stated-owned land, so as to stable the land selling price and housing price. Land use right’s bidding is an important way of the stated-owned land market selling, So the study of the stated-owned land use right bidding sale under the background of the land marketization is the inevitable realistic demand.The current literatures directly devoted to study the state-owned land use right bidding sale are rare. Some of them analyzed the situation and problems of the land use right bidding from comprehensive general perspective,or some discussed the balancing price of the land use right bidding sale briefly, or some discussed the qualitative relationship between the land use right bidding sale and the land price and the housing price. These scattered unsystematic study can’t meet the demands of reality. This study extends the research pespective of the state-owned land use right bidding sale in theory, and also enrich and deepen its research content and framework.Some measures and ideas to cope with the stated-owned land use right bidding sale problems are put forward, these can provide references for the government’s further regulating and perfecting land transfer system.The state-owned land use right’s selling through marketization way is the inevitable trend and requirement of land marketization. The operating state-owned land use right’s bidding is an important way and mean of the state-owned land use right’s marketization selling. The research object is the state-owned land use right’s public bidding under the background of land marketization. The literature methodology, case study and instance analysis, empirical research method, game method are used to do this research. And the principal-agent theory is the basis of the analysis and research. The incentive and constraint mechanism of the major players(the government department as the direct tenderer, the bid evaluation.the bidder and so on) are studied furtherly. Finally this paper concludes the following main research conclusion.(1)The land resource administrative department and its designated authorized subordinate institution in the city or county are considered as the direct tenderer in the government department. Combined with the current existing political administrative system, the state-owned land property right in China has formed the following administrative principal-agent chains:the people of the whole country--the national people’s congress--the central government of the state council--local governments--the administrative department of land resources of local government--the specific staff in local land resource administrative department. Specific to the state-owned land use right bidding transfer, the local government land resources administrative department as the direct tenderer, the problems triggered by administrative agent will also appear such as that the superior client is difficult to inspect the agents at a lower level, softening the constraint to the agent at lower levels and incentive system to the agent is incompatible, and short-term and opportunism behavior problems will appear. The current incentive and constraint problems of the land selling’s principal-agent are explained and verified in detail by the empirical principal component and regression analysis from two levels of the whole country and the local government in Chongqing,Shanghai and Gansu.In the current existing administrative principal-agent. the government’s administrative department of land resource is representative of the state-owned land property right and land managers, has state-owned land owner’s management function and government administrative departments of land management function, which is bound to cause functional dislocation, behavior anomie, responsibility fuzzy, the incentive incompatibility, constraints softening and so on naturally. Based on this the author puts forward a modified idea of land property rights entrusted agency, constructing land property rights market principal agent, stripping the land management functions from government, establishing state-owned land management company. And the government and state-owned land management companies are connected through the marketability contract. And then the research to the incentive and constraint mechanism of the direct government department(as the direct tenderer) is changed to the research of the incentive and constraint mechanism of the state-owned land management company’s operating agent.(2)The main principal-agent problems of the tenderer and the bid evaluation in the stated-owned land use right bidding sale action are:the bid evaluation labor remuneration is fixed, the overall pay level is not high which lacks of the positive incentive; the arbitrary behavior of the bid evaluation is in a high probability which likely affects the justice and fairness of the bid assessment results; the bid evaluation’s rights and his responsibilities is inequality.Although the fixed compensation model for the evaluation’s incentive is feasible in theory, but the actual measurement of the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint for the evaluation is difficult. And combining with the current general implementation of the evaluation’s low remuneration, the fixed compensation has inherent incentive defects. Therefore the author puts forward the pay+bonus (f+j) of incentive compensation model, and the solution to the incentive compensation model is analyzed. Then based on the evaluation’s incentive reward mechanism, the incentive mechanism of reputation influence function is constructed, and the necessity of the implementation of incentive reward mechanism was verified by the reputation incentive mechanism.The incentive model’s effection is also verified by using specific example analysis, the research shows that compared with fixed compensation mode the(f+j) incentive model has a greater incentive motivation. After that the constraint mechanism to the evaluation is analyzed from maim four sides:formulating and perfecting the unified laws to regulate the evaluation, establishing and perfecting the specific management system for the evaluation, assessing the evaluation’s work after the item is finished, making dynamic management of the evaluation experts.(3) According to the actual situation of the current land prices and housing price and the national macro regulation’s demand guide, the national regulators advocate that the comprehensive evaluation selling method of state-owned land is a good way. Then as that the comprehensive evaluation selling method of state-owned land is analyzed in detail through the actual case from sides of the business standard evaluation system and the technical bid evaluation system. Then the comprehensive evaluation selling methods combining with the analytic hierarchy process method and the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method are used to analyze the actual concrete example.And the results from the two different methods are analyzed and compared. These actual example analysis on the improving way for the current state-owned land use right’s selling has made beneficial exploration.(4)The previous system of the operating state-owned land sale by the way of agreement has significant defects. It makes bad affection to the main market body, the use of land resources, the ruling party and the government’s credibility, the operation and welfare level of the society. And it is these factors that promoting the changes of the state-owned land use right transfer system. Then the original agreement system was changed to the new system which calls for that the profit-making stated-owned land’s sale must adopt public bidding, auction and listing. Comparing with the previous agreement system, the transfer of state-owned land use right is by the way of public bidding, this is the natural most effective incentive for the potential purchase or the bidders. The stated-owed land use right’s public biddng sale can reduce the potential purchase’s transaction costs, can give them more confidence to join the fair competition.can increase the possibility and probability of their fair business profit.So The potential purchase or the bidder has a strong positive participation motivation. Seeing the year2004as the cut-off point, according to the national data and the data from Chongqing city, the incentive effect of the agreement system and the incentive effect of public bidding auction listing system are compared by the empirical correlation and regression analysis from two sides of the supplier local government and the demander the real estate development enterprise.(5) In the practical bidding action of state-owned land selling, the bidders in collusion using unilateral pay mechanism is effective and incentive compatibility and also efficient. Unilateral pay mechanism becomes the dominant reality choice when the bidders choose making collusion. The danger of bidders’collusion in the state-owned land use right’s selling action is huge. This must be reckoned. Based on the above analysis, the dynamic bayesian game model of the bidders’collusion in the state-owned land use right selling is built, and the bidders’bid collusion behavior is analyzed in detail by the signal game theory, then the dynamic bayesian game model were analyzed with the specific actual cases. According to the verification and analysis of the dynamic bayesian game model, several measures for restraining the bidder’s collusion are put forward as the following:attracting more bidding participants, setting up reasonable land base price, controlling a single transfered land’s area appropriately, perfecting the relevant legal system of bidding, constructing market credit system.(6) According to the actual situation of the state-owned land use right bidding sale, it analyzes the main existing main players(the government’s supervising representative, bidders, the bid evaluation and the tenderer) in the state-owned land use right bidding sale action. Then it illustrates the reason of the bidders,the bid evaluation and the tender’s multipartite collusion in detail from four aspects. And their three main collusion ways were analyzed too. Then their multipartite collusion’s game models were constructed respectively to study. With the combination of the multipartite collusion’s game analysis conclusion, several main measures for restraining the multipartite collusion in the state-owned land use right bidding sale action are put forward as the following:building the supervising system, making trade information open and transparent, constructing the reward system of exposing and supervising, increasing collusion cost, emphasizing punishment’s degree largely.In conclusion, according to the real demand this paper studies the state-owned land use right bidding sale under the background of land marketization deeply and systematically with the principal-agent theory, this is a new research perspective. It analyzes the main principal-agent problems of the several major players in the state-owned land use bidding action respectively. Then the research of the incentive mechanism and constraint mechanism was seemed as the key to solve the series problems of the state-owned land use right bidding sale action. These are the new research and exploration.It has certain innovative value. |
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