Study On Coupled Regulation Of Food Safety Certification And Traceability System

With the rapid process of urbanization, driven by consumer demand and profit, global food industry rapidly evolves to intensive production methods. Agricultural production tends to go after yield, appearance, storage function and other commercial characteristics. It is difficult to guarantee inherent health and safety of food, food safety incidents were common. Food safety issues have become a focus of the world. In this context, food safety certification and traceability system have become important tool for food safety management, and play a huge role in avoiding food safety risk, reducing information asymmetry, purifying food industry. But both systems have deficiencies in their regulatory that affect their operational efficiency. Therefore, explore coupled regulation of food safety certification and traceability system, to integrate regulatory resource and improve regulatory efficiency, to promote close cooperation, support each other and complementary of food safety certification and traceability system. Thus, both system guarantee food safety jointly. There will be of great significance for food safety management.The paper is based on research methods of game theory and experimental economics, on the basis of presenting development status and evaluation of China’s food safety certification and traceability system. First, it researches the stakeholders’ game behaviors under background of coupled regulation of food safety certification and traceability. Then, design and implementation of economic experiment to simulate stakeholders’game behaviors and provide a strong basis for building coupled regulation mechanisms of food safety certification and traceability system.The content of this paper consists four parts as below:firstly, summarize current development status of China’s food safety certification and traceability system, analysis regulatory deficiencies in both systems respectively and explore the necessity and possibility of coupling regulation. Secondly, build three game model of certification bodies-enterprises, certification bodies-enterprises-farmers, certification bodies-enterprises-regulators(supervision department, consumers),to analysis game balance of stakeholders’ relations from different perspective. Thirdly, on the basis of analysis of game, use the methods of experimental economics to design and implement game experiments, to simulate stakeholders’game behaviors and observe choice behavior and interactions of stakeholders, testing Game Model. Fourthly, on the basis of game analysis and experimental results, analyze the characteristics of regulatory environment and stakeholders of China’s food safety certification and traceability system, and build coupled regulation mechanisms.The main conclusion of the paper consists of five parts as below:firstly, coupled regulation of food safety certification and traceability system has its necessity and feasibility. Secondly, interaction between certification bodies and enterprises is the core of stakeholders’game behavior under background of coupled regulation. Thirdly, consumers are the important subject in forming power mechanism of coupled regulation of food safety certification and traceability system. Fourthly, traceability and accountability function are important force in forming restriction mechanism of coupled regulation of food safety certification and traceability system. Fifthly, system and institution are the basis and interaction between stakeholders is the core of the formation and effective operation of coupled regulation mechanisms of food safety certification and traceability system.Features and innovations of this paper are as follows. Firstly, its theory has some characters in novelty and creativity. In the context of food safety certification and traceability system in their respective development and facing regulatory challenges, the paper put forward the idea of coupled regulation of food safety certification and traceability system, breaks through the limitation of analyzing supervision problem of food safety certification system and traceability system separately, provide new ideas for food safety management theory. Secondly, its method is advanced. It is innovative in method that the paper put forward an application of experimental economics on study of food safety supervision problems.