The Method About Complex System Reliability Growth Segmentde Evaluation Based On Bayes Information Fusion

In most industries and technologies, there has a large technological gap between domestic latecomer enterprises and foreign leader enterprises. Latecomer firms have some advantages, exploiting the advantages of latecomer companies need introduce technology, digestion and absorption, in order to lift technical capacity, and ultimately meet or exceed the leading foreign enterprises’ technical level. In the process of technology introduction, patent licensing is a common way. Owing to the obvious technology gap exists between latecomer firms and foreign enterprises, along with the patent thickets and patent portfolio, multi- patented product is more prevalent in modern complex products. During the game of patent licensing fees negotiation, the latecomer firm is obviously in a weak position, resulting in patent licensing fees are usually higher than a reasonable level which means patent holdup.With the introduction of economic theory, game theory, build a patent licensing model in the game, the derivation of the competition in homogeneous products between latecomer firms and leading companies in the game process. This paper issues three ways of the formation mechanism of patent holdup. First, the latecomer reduce production costs by reducing patent licensing, combined with the advantages to expand market share, in order to achieve profitable growth after the license, in this case the latecomer pays the leader high license fees which means patent holdup.Second, in the process of patent licensing, foreign leader enterprises will consider the R & D costs, the costs will be paid by the latecomer firms, so the patent fee is more than the normal level means patent holdup. Third when patent licensing is a patent portfolio, the patent portfolio is likely to have some invalid patents, these invalid patents are lack of novelty or inventiveness, so their economic value is extremely limited, and the patent portfolio license fees is based on all patents are valid, the patent holder obtain such license fees significantly exceed a reasonable level, and which means patent holdup.Based on the above conclusions, the paper issues two strategies for coping patent holdup from the corporate and regulatory policy views. In the latecomer firms’ view, the primary task is to improve their technical capabilities to bridge the technology gap with foreign leaders to increase the bargaining power in the patent licensing. The following task is establishing the corporate’s patent strategy, including patent research and cross-licensing strategy, these two strategies can effectively weaken the impact of patent holdup. But the patent strategy is closely related to the technical capabilities, technology stage, so we should consider both the overall consideration of the mutual influence between the two in order to play a better role in the strategy. In the policy level, analyze some shortcomings of the existing patent law, antitrust law and related laws, based on these shortcomings this paper give some suggestions to cope with the patent holdup.