An Empirical Study On The Influence Of Corporate Governance On The Performances Of Chinese Listed Banks

The Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis in 2007 made people gradually aware that corporate governance has a great influence on bank performance, and even affects the stability of financial system and development of national economy. At present, there still lack related research at home, besides, bank governance structure and mechanism of our country are not yet perfect. So scaling up the research of the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance is significant for enriching the theory and guiding the practice.This paper explores the influence of corporate governance on bank performance by way of combining theoretical analysis and empirical study, and puts forward reasonable suggestions to perfect the structure and mechanisms of corporate governance of listed Banks in our country.In terms of theory, the paper makes a literal review, introducing the related concepts and the theory foundation of corporate governance, in addition, showing relevant research on the relationship between corporate governance and operating performance at home and abroad. Next, the paper analyses the particularity of banks and the particularity of bank corporate governance, and analyses the principle of the influence of corporate governance on bank performance from four aspects, including ownership structure, board structure, supervisor structure and executive incentive. Then it concludes that bank performance has a negative correlation with the shareholding ratio of first major shareholder, with the shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders, with the ratio between the first largest shareholder and the second largest shareholder. The bank performance has a positive correlation with the proportion of independent directors, and has a negative correlation with the supervisors’ size. The bank performance has no significant correlation with board size and the mean compensation of top three executives.Finally, this paper puts forward relative countermeasures and suggestions based on the results of empirical research. One is optimizing equity structure, lowering equity concentration. The second is to enhance the board independence, improve the quality of the decision-making. The third is to define the functions of the board of supervisors, enhance the independence of the board of supervisors. The four is to establish long-term incentive and restraint mechanism for executives.