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Study On Efficiency And Equity Of Cross-Regional Green Supply Chain Coordination With Local Authority’s Subsidies

Posted on:2016-03-11Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:R ChengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330482467322Subject:Logistics engineering
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With the increasingly strengthen of the environment and resource restriction, the development concept of green and low carbon is widely accepted, which makes the green supply chain management theory become the focus of global attention. Manufacturers, retailers, consumers and government are participants and stakeholders of the green supply chain system that balances both economic benefits and environmental constraints. The maximum benefits of these participants only can be realized by cooperation, coordination, supervision and restraint of each other, with the maximization of the total green supply chain system’s economy and social benefit. Usually the participant enterprises of the green supply chain often belong to different local authority for its different locations, which make their decision-making behavior involved in the green supply chain management affected and restricted by different local authority’s intervention policy. Currently, the green supply chain coordination has two issues needed to be solved:(1) for enterprises, how to formulate the sales prices and green degree of products with impact of the local authority’s intervention policy to assure the efficiency of the supply chain coordination;(2) for local authority, how to make a reasonable intervention policy to assure the equity among the participant enterprises of the cross-regional green supply chain. The following chapters are mainly dedicated to the above issues, based on the previous practical experience and research, and focus on the efficiency and equity of the coordination of single-stage and multi-stage green supply chain with the local authority’s subsidy. The main contents of the paper are as follows.(1) Study on the coordination of a single-stage and two enterprises green supply chain with local authority’s subsidies. Firstly, given the indistinct substitution of the two products for consumers, the price and the green degree of products were introduced into the products’demand function. Then, supposed that the local authority’s intervention policy of subsidies only impact on green product, single-stage and two enterprises green supply chain coordination models were proposed based on Bertrand game. Finally, the relationship among product sales prices, green degree and government were analyzed.(2) Study on the coordination of the multi-stage cross-regional green supply chain with local authority’s subsidies. For the multi-stage cross-regional green supply chains with different local authority’s subsidies, two scenarios were analyzed, i.e. the different influences of the sales price and the green degree of the product on market demand. Then multi-stage cross-regional green supply chain coordination models were proposed based on the Stackelberg game. Finally, the participant enterprises’decisions and local authority’s subsidy policy in different scenarios were analyzed.(3) Study on the equity of the cross-regional green supply chain with local authority’s subsidies. For the local authority’s differential subsidies policy’s different impact on the participant enterprises of different stages, two scenarios were analyzed, i.e. multi-stage network structure and general network structure of the cross-regional green supply chain. Then, Theil index was suggested as the upper decision goal and the Stackelberg game of the multi-stage green supply chain coordination with government subsidies was suggested as the lower decision goal, a bi-level programming model was proposed. Finally, based on the minimum inequity in cross-regional green supply chain, the participant enterprises’ decisions and local authority’s subsidy policy in different scenarios were analyzed.
Keywords/Search Tags:cross-regional green supply chain, government subsidy, efficiency and equity, bi-level programming, bertrand game, stackelberg game
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