Decision-Making Of Enterprise And Supply Chain Under Green Manufacturing

Some enterprises begin to carry out the green manufacturing by certain external pressures, such as the severeness of environment pollution, the strengthening of environment regulations and the enhancement of national living standard. However, the study of green manufacturing is at its early stage in China, and research works on the decision-making of supply chain members and the relation between government and supply chain operation are gradually the focus by using game theory. So, combining the quantitative model and qualitative analysis, taken the existing research results and practice experiences, some kinds of decision problem of firm and supply chain under green manufacturing are studied. Then, some management stragies are given based on these results. The main research contents and findings are as following.(1) Based on different development trends and various development levels of green productive benefit, the decision-making and interaction between green manufacturer and government are studied by the analysis method of multi-stage game. Then the mechanisms that the government supervision has an influence on green production under variant scenarios are explored. Lastly some corresponding and effective policy suggestions on government promoting green production are put forward. It is shown that when green productive profit is uptrend, government must step down the probability of inspection, meanwhile increase fines; when green productive profit is downtrend, government must rise the probability of inspection step by step, however it isn’t always good for green production to increase fines, so government shall create a favorable police environment for improving green productive benefit, which enhances core competitiveness of the enterprise.(2) The incentive mechanism for green supply chain with the uncertain yield is studied by Stackelberg game model based on government subsidies. Then, the impacts of the mean and volatility of random yield rate on decision-making policies and profits of supply chain parties are analyzed by the mathematical methods, and the incentive effect of government subsidy for green supply chain is also discussed by numerical simulation technology. The results show that with the increasing of random yield rate’s mean, the manufacturer, the retailer and consumers are able to benefit, while with the increasing of random yield’s volatility, the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer both are loss, the green degree of product and the order quantity of the retailer both are decrease; Government subsidy policy can reduce the risk that is supply chain member’s profits declining and retailer’s order quantity decreasing because of random yield’s volatility.(3) For the green supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a recycler, the manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model under the collection compensation policy is constructed on the idea of extended producer responsibility. By mathematical methods, the recycling rate of end-of-life product, manufacturer’s profit and recycler’s profit after the collection compensation policy are studied. And the influences of relevant factors to the effectiveness of policy implementation are analyzed by some numerical examples. The results show that, under the condition of reducing environmental protection fees, the efficiency of resource recycling after the collection compensation policy is higher than that before the collection compensation policy, the benefits of green supply chain members after the collection compensation policy are better than those before the collection compensation policy, the implementation of the collection compensation policy has validity; other factors, such as the price of raw material purchasing and the variable recycling cost of end-of-life product, are important to promote the implementation effectiveness of the collection compensation policy.(4) Aiming at the operation mechanism of dual-channel green supply chain under one retailer and one recycler’s collection, the game models with same pricing and differential pricing are constructed by game theory. Then, the existing optimal strategies of supply chain under dual channel are compared with single recycling channel, and the comparison between same pricing and differential pricing is made. And the influences of relevant factors over the operation mechanism of dual-channel green supply chain with differential pricing are analyzed by some numerical examples. The results show that, from economic, social and environment benefits, the dual-channel collection is better for the manufacturer than the single-channel collection; and the manufacturer is inclined to differential pricing mode for dual-channel collection, but the same pricing mode is helpful to improve the recycling rate of used products; other factors, such as the cost of a new product, the price sensitivity coefficient and the recycling cost of a used product, are important to promote the implementation effectiveness of differential pricing strategy.(5) The game model of closed-loop supply chain is constructed when green design is taken into account by the manufacturer. Then, effects of green design on recycling and pricing decision for supply chain, and the influences of relevant factors, such as consumers’green awareness factors, the investment-green scaling parameter, the price sensitivity coefficient and the recycling cost of a used product, are analyzed by some numerical examples. The result show that, green design can improve the recycling rate of end-of-life products, which is available to promote the remanufacturing; the increase of consumers’green awareness factors and the decrease of the investment-green scaling parameter both can enhance the green degree and the enthusiasm of manufacturer’s green design; the reduction of the recycling cost of a used product can advance the recycling rate of used products and the green degree, decrease the wholesale price, expand demand, add the profits of manufacturer, which is benefit for enterprise, consumers and environment.(6) Based on carbon tax and consumers’ low-carbon awareness, the manufacturer Stackelberg model for both reducing and no reducing carbon emission scenarios is proposed, which closed-loop supply chain is consist of a manufacturer, a retailer and a recycler. The optimal strategies of closed-loop supply chain are obtained. Then, the equilibrium solutions and profits is contrasted in two scenarios, and the influences of relevant factors, such as consumers’ low-carbon awareness, the investment-reduce-emission scaling parameter and carbon tax, are analyzed by some numerical examples. The result shows that, it is effective countermeasures for carbon tax that the manufacturer reduces carbon emission; when carbon tax is lower than consumers’ low-carbon awareness, the retailer’s order quantity don’t decrease because of advancing the wholesale price, but increase; the increase of consumers’ low-carbon awareness and the decrease of the investment-reduce-emission scaling parameter both can increase emission reduction, production quantity and recycling rate; the unit emission reduction and the recycling rate of used products are increased with the increasing of carbon tax, while the manufacturer’s profit and the supply chain’s performance are declined.