A Theoretical And Empirical Research On The Licensing Of Patent Pools

Since Patent Pool Licensing plays a very important role in promoting competition, many countries especially the developed ones attach great importance to it. However, some phenomena deserve our attention and consideration:Why are there some major outsiders in many influential patent pools? Why do some patent pools have a large number of potential licensees while others are disorganized in a short time? The present dissertation aims at answering such questions.Firstly, after analyzing the characteristics of Patent Pool Licensing and basing on the two game models, the paper proposes a new systemic explanation:Patent Pool Licensing of all kinds is in essence the gaming process between the two parties, with the result of signing contract for licensing or not. This paper holds that there are two kinds of licensing which are between a patent pool and its necessary patentees and between a patent pool and its potential licensees. Whatever kind of Patent Pool Licensing, the relationship between the two parties is both competition and cooperation with the aim at maximizing their profits. Only when the two parties gain their expected profits can there appear a gaming balance. If signing contract for licensing can both make the two parties gain their expected profits, they will cooperate. If signing contract for licensing can make neither party gain its expected profits or only can make one party gain its expected profits, they will compete.Secondly, the paper discusses three kinds of licensing ways:the way of licensing contract, the way of licensing distribution and the way of licensing pricing, among which, the former is the general way, for it is the base of the latter two ways. This paper holds that the result of gaming is signing contract for distribution and pricing. Patent Pool Licensing contract fall into three types:licensing contract between the necessary patentees, between patent pool management and the pool members and between patent pool management and potential licensees. There are three distribution models:necessary patent value distribution, necessary patents quantity distribution and non-distribution licensing fee. The first two models, with their advantages and disadvantages, are in line with the distribution principle of "region first"; in other words, all the licensing fees should be distributed among the producing countries and the sale countries on an even base, and in the same region there is a quadratic assignment according to the contract. The third model includes voluntary distribution and obligatory distribution. Pricing way of Patent Pool Licensing includes pricing principles, unanimously adopting the RAND principle, and pricing policies, usually adopting one-stop licensing model. Licensing fees fall into three kinds:fixed, variable and even free.Finally, this paper examines the double impacts of patent pools on innovation and competition in China, and raises corresponding solutions. In view of the positive and negative influence of Patent Pool Licensing on China's innovation and the competition, we propose three suggestions:1) we should envisage the positive role played by Patent Pool Licensing and employ all those patent pools which are conducive to China's development; 2) our national enterprises should enhance their independent innovation ability, make full use of the current practices and adopt multidimensional methods to licensing their patents; 3) our government should take measures in policy, system and economy so as to encourage and support national enterprises to participate in patent pool licensing.