Patent Licensing Strategy Of Duopoly Innovation Enterprises

Patent license in the process of enterprise competition and technology transfer plays a more and more important role. In this paper, the analysis model between the patent holder and the licensee is build from the perspective of risk preference of the patentee, combined with game theory, risk theory and bass model. The effect of risk to the patentee licensing strategy is analysis, and the patent licensing strategy of different risk preference is reveal. The patent licensing strategies of the innovation enterprise on different product life cycle is also analyzed.Patent licensing model with risk appetite is set up based on the Cournot model, assuming the risk appetite of the innovative enterprise and the adequacy of its innovation capital will influence its patent license strategies. Research shows that:the ex post licensing strategy will be adopted when the licensee is risk neutral or risk aversion, and the ex-ante licensing strategy will be adopted when the licensee is risk appetite.The ex-post licensing decision model is established on the basis of bass model, the and the patent licensing strategies of two companies will be different on different product life cycle. Research shows that the patent licensing strategies of two companies will be influenced by the product life cycle. The enterprise will not license when the equilibrium income is greater than the product sales at some point. Two sides will conduct patent license if product sales volume is greater than the equilibrium, In addition, the model parameters were estimated with the nonlinear least squares method, and we can forecast the product sales and provide the basis for enterprise decision.