Research On Effects Of Independent Directors’ Busy Behavior On Executives Corruption In Stated-owned Enterprises

Since the convening of the Party’s 18, with the anti-corruption efforts at all levels continue to strengthen, some Chinese state -owned enterprises’executives who violated law or discipline had been investigated. State-owned enterprise are the mainstay of the national economy, playing a leading role on the whole economic development, representing the goals and interests of all Chinese people. It’s the important guarantee of the national economy sustained and rapid development. State-owned enterprises is not only related to China’s economic security, as an important economic foundation of our party ruling ability, state-owned enterprises related to our country’s political security. The executives of state-owned enterprises falling by the wayside, the scandal-prone, not only bring economic losses for our country and people, it is a serious adverse impact on the whole social atmosphere, so it is necessary to explore the factors of state executive corruption.The relevant agencies play a most important role in the investigation of the corruption cases of the executives in state-owned enterprises, but the fundamental nature of executives corruption is a self-interested behavior from the commissioned agency theory. The nature reason of executives corruption is agency costs, so academics have a fierce discussion about how to reduce agency costs. The previous studies of areas of corporate governance mostly about board of directors, executive compensation, institutional investors and so on. These study mostly focus on the division of management, and strengthen internal oversight mechanism of executive also a way to reduce agency costs. Current research of the impact of the internal oversight mechanisms to executives corruption involving the validity of supervisory board and independent directors, and most study of independent directors’ validity are about the feature of independent directors. There are still large gaps in the study of the effectiveness of independent directors’ behaviorIn view of this, this paper based on the perspective of independent directors’ busy behavior, to study the effect of the state-owned enterprise’s executive corruption. By reviewing and combing the research about supervision of independent directors, busy independent directors and executives corruption. Based on the reputation theory, social capital theory and asymmetric information theory, select empirical as the main research method. Select state-owned enterprises during 2009-2013 as samples, analysis the relationship between busy behavior of independent directors in state-owned enterprise and executives corruption. The results show that the busy additional behavior of independent directors and the busy meeting attending behavior both have positive correlation with executives corruption. This shows that China’s state-owned enterprises should be limited to the independent directors of the part-time job too much, in order to ensure that they have sufficient time and energy to perform their duties.It should accelerate the improvement of the reputation mechanism theory, enhance the efficiency of the meetings of the board’s decision-making, avoid excessive useless meeting..This paper adds material to the studies of executives corruption of state-owned enterprise, makes recommendations to consummate the market of independent directors and improve the validity of independent directors’ busy behavior.