On The Static Games Under Complete Information Among The Stakeholders Of The Agro-tech Cooperation Between Fujian And Taiwan From The Perspective Of Taiwan Agricultural Businesses

The agro-tech cooperation between Fujian and Taiwan is an important measure to improve the development and industrialization of Fujian agriculture. The respective agricultural development in Fujian and Taiwan are highly complementary and it is the unique advantage for agro-tech cooperation. Fujian takes positive attitude and participates actively to promote this cooperation whereas Taiwan, due to political, economic and other factors, adopts a relatively restrictive approach, limiting the in-depth development of the agro-tech cooperation between Fujian and Taiwan.The paper, based on the static game theory under complete information, analyzes the behaviors of the stakeholders in the agro-tech cooperation from the perspective of Taiwan agricultural businesses and puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions based on the empirical results in order to promote further development of the agro-tech cooperation between Fujian and Taiwan.Firstly, with the introduction of the research background, the paper proposes research methods and research contents, reviews related researches home and abroad on the present situation of the agro-tech cooperation between Fujian and Taiwan, the collaboration and conflicts among major subjects in the cooperation, and the pertinent solutions.Secondly, the paper begins with the classification and elements of game and game theory. The static game theory under complete information is introduced as well as the strategy categories and the equilibrium. The paper further analyzes current development of agro-tech cooperation in Fujian and Taiwan, the cooperative models, major achievements, and the issues existing.The paper, from the perspective of Taiwan agricultural businesses, uses the knowledge of static game theory under complete information to observe the interactive behaviors and actions among different stakeholders and how they reach the equilibrium considering all the contradictions and conflicts. The pertinent games played by different groups are the game between Taiwan agricultural businesses and Taiwan agricultural management agencies, the game between Taiwan agricultural businesses and Fujian agricultural management agencies, the game between Taiwan agricultural businesses and Taiwan agricultural businesses, and the game between Taiwan agricultural businesses and Fujian farmers.Finally, the paper, based the results of the empirical analysis, puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to improve the agro-tech cooperation between Fujian and Taiwan. These include the optimization of policy institutions on the agro-tech cooperation between Taiwan and Fujian, the active improvement of the investment environment, especially the soft investment environment to enhance of the attractiveness to Taiwan agricultural businesses, and the increase of the cost of breaching the contractual obligations for the agro-tech cooperation to improve the compliance rate.