Study On Pricing Strategies Of Third-party Reverse Logistics Providers And Subsidy Methods Of Government For Weee Based On The Game Theory

In recent years, as public strengthening consciousness of multiple economic, environmental and social benefits, depletion of nonrenewable resources and rising costs for new energy exploration, the increasing importance of WEEE reverse logistics, especially WEEE third-party reverse logistics has become the focus of academic and business circles. Both of appropriate pricing strategies and well-established system have positive have positive effects on the sustainable development of WEEE reverse logistics. Given all this, based on the existing research results, the study on pricing strategies of third-party reverse logistics providers and subsidy methods of government for WEEE has been finished in this paper by the use of literature review method, game analysis, comparative approach and example analysis. The main contents of the research in this paper include the following aspects:(1) The pricing strategies of third-party reverse logistics providers under the condition of full information are discussed firstly. The paper respectively discusses the RP third-party reverse logistics pricing model and the DDP third-party reverse logistics pricing model under the condition of full information base on the game theory. With these models, the pricing strategies and the relationships among variables in different recycle modes and cooperation modes are discussed. It is found in this paper that cooperation is the best choice for the participants in WEEE reverse logistics system. In order to make the profits of the reverse logistics system maximized, the participants can develop extensive cooperation by coordinated approaches such as revenue sharing contracts.(2) The pricing strategies of third-party reverse logistics providers under the condition of incomplete information are discussed secondly. The paper respectively discusses the static game model under the uncertain disassembling cost condition and the signal game model under the uncertain disassembling quality condition. By the game analysis, the optimal strategy for third-party reverse logistics providers including disassembling enterprises under the condition of incomplete information is put forward in this paper, which enriches the research of WEEE reverse logistics system and provides practical references for the pricing decision of third-party reverse logistics providers.(3) Subsidy methods of government for WEEE third-party reverse logistics are discussed lastly. The paper respectively discusses the game model between government and WEEE recycling enterprises and the game model among government, WEEE recycling enterprises and EEE producers. On the basis of pure strategy Nash equilibrium analysis and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, this paper provides a realistic basis for the government to formulate more rational subsidy policy and benefits the green development of WEEE reverse logistics system by exploring the influential factors related with the decision-making of WEEE reverse logistics participants.This paper places great emphasis on the study of pricing strategies of WEEE third-party reverse logistics participants and subsidy methods of government. As results, some available, operable and sustainable suggestions for pricing decision-making of the participants in reverse logistics system are presented in this paper in order to contribute to reducing negative environmental effects, promoting utilization ratio of resources and developing cyclic economy.