Font Size: a A A

Research On Enterprise Investment Strategy Under The Restriction Of Low-carbon Economy

Posted on:2017-01-02Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y J ShiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330485474768Subject:Financial management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Development of low carbon economy has been widely recognized around the world, which as a fundamental way to coordinate the development of social economy, ensure energy security and deal with climate changes. Global financial crisis prompted the world economy to accelerate the development of low-carbon economy, which acts as an important driving force to achieve the goal of global emission reduction, to promote economic recovery and to impel sustainable development. The main developed countries, with the advantages of new technology and system innovation in low-carbon areas, have already stepped up the implementation of low-carbon economic development strategy, and intend to build a new pattern of the world’s new round of industrial and technological competition. The traditional development model of high carbon economy in China is facing severe challenges, so it is imperative to transform to low-carbon economy. As one of the main sources of funds to develop low-carbon economy, there is a problem of credit risk of funds in bank loan.The enterprise low-carbon financing problem will be researched in this paper, which relates to the relationships between banks and enterprises applying for loans, because the loan application enterprises and banks are rational actors to pursue certain interests, both sides inevitably have conflicts of interest in cooperation, using game theories is a more scientific method to analyze the problem. In view of this, taking the development of low-carbon economy as the research background in this paper, it aim to analyze financing strategy choice of enterprise under the constraint of low carbon economy by using the relevant model of game theory as analysis tool.At the beginning, the background and significance of enterprise’s low carbon financing research have been elaborated. There are four aspects to illustrate the current research status of related issues in the world: the concept of low-carbon economy, the impact to enterprises of development low carbon production, relevant content of the low-carbon finance enterprise and low carbon game studies. And further analysis mentality and innovation is pointed out. Secondly, there lists the low-carbon economy, low-carbon financing, game theories, and the present financing situation. By introduction of related theories and present situations, which lays a good foundation for further analyzing the games between banks and enterprises to choose appropriate strategies; Thirdly, the complete information dynamic game model and incomplete information dynamic game model have been constructed according to the games between banks and enterprises in two different situations: At first, the complete information dynamic game model has been constructed according to the situation of information transparent, which explains that credit supervisions of banks and other financial institutions play the role to urge enterprises to select low-carbon production; Next, the incomplete information dynamic game model has been constructed, according to the situation of information asymmetries, focusing on the efficiency of asymmetric information transfer between low-carbon loan application enterprises and banks, which aims to analyze the balanced realization condition and corresponding to reality in three different conditions: separating equilibrium, pure strategy of pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium; Finally, based on the variable factors in game analysis conclusion which influence both choice of strategy, the paper puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations respectively from three aspects of banks, enterprises and government, to promote enterprises to make decisions which consistent with economic development situation.
Keywords/Search Tags:Low-carbon economy, Low-carbon finance, Dynamic games, Information asymmetries
PDF Full Text Request
Related items