Low-Carbon Product Selection Strategy Under The Consumer’s Low-Carbon Preference

With the rapid development of China’s low-carbon economy, as well as today’s consumers gradually increase awareness of low-carbon, more and more companies considered the production of low carbon products to cater to such consumer demand. Currently, through the procurement of low-carbon raw materials to reduce carbon emissions has become an important means of production of low-carbon products. However, compared with the production of ordinary products, the cost of procurement of raw materials to produce low-carbon products is higher. Faced with an increasingly competitive market, under the situation of low-carbon consumer preferences, competition manufacturers are to maximize their own profit, considering whether to purchase the production of low-carbon low-carbon products. The article studied the competitioned of manufacturers’s choice of low carbon product to maximize profit.Firstly, with consumer’s low-carbon preference, the article studied the effects of lateral holding to competitive manufacturers’s procurement policy choices. We studied the two supply chain of low-carbon emission reductions when purchasing carbon symmetric and asymmetric situation, analyze the impact of the manufacturer stake on both sides balanced strategy game. The study found that when the two manufacturers’s carbon reduction are asymmetriced, lower level and low-carbon preferences stake will encourage both manufacturers have chosen to production mode, with the increase of its stake, the game both sides will choose low carbon strategy which will reach Nash equilibrium, when the degree of preference and low-carbon stake are high, manufacturers differentiation strategy choices will become balanced; when the two supply chain carbon reductions asymmetry, moderate or low low preferences and a smaller carbon level carbon emissions urge both sides to make a difference in differential choice; when the level of consumer low-carbon preference is low, large differences in carbon emissions will lead to Nash equilibrium can not be achieved.Secondly, Under the situation of consumer’s low-carbon preferences, considered a big company as the industry leader competed with a number of small companies, studied the problem of large enterprise’s choose of low-carbon products. We established a modle that small business product ordinary goods, the large enterprises have twe choices of low-carbon or ordinary products. When small businesses are asymmetric, the big carbon emission reduction encourage the large companie choose to produce low-carbon products, and it will get the higher retail prices. The small enterprises can have a higher product yield when the large company choosed the ordinary produc. If the large enterprise and small businesses are competed, or large enterprises in a monopoly position, the higher or lower carbon products carbon emissions will lead to large-volume production of low-carbon products; if the product differentiation between large enterprises and small businesses, or small business competed vehemently, the small businesses are still at a disadvantage, lower carbon emission reductions will promote the large enterprises to choose ordinary products.Finally, based on the study, we choosed two cases in our paper. Shell Group of Companies and Sichuan Shengma Chemical Industry Stock Co.. Ltd. We studied the ordinary gasoline and low-carbon gasoline under the premise of the background and current situation, analyzed the choices of the two companies in different production background, and strive to conclusions theory to guide enterprise product selection decisions, and status of the business case to guide future directions of theoretical research.