On Design Of China’s Small And Medium-sized Shareholding Commercial Banks’ Salary Incentive Mechanism

Under the background of the current economic globalization and the rapid development of Internet, the shareholding commercial banks in China are facing huge impact of foreign banks and the financial companies. Many senior managers and key personnel switch to another companies, shareholding commercial banks face the grim problem of brain drain. We can see that behind the frequent brain drain is the imbalance of bank employee compensation amount and structure, thus establish a reasonable, fair, scientific salary incentive mechanism is vital for stable staff team and the backbone reserves. Reasonable salary incentive mechanism can not only mobilize the work enthusiasm of the employees, but also can promote the sustainable and healthy development of the bank. In recent years, the shareholding commercial banks in China also actively explore more perfect compensation mechanism, such as long-term incentive like equity incentive mechanism, but due to various reasons, at present this area is far inferior to abroad.This article starts from the basic concept of compensation and incentive theory, introduces the crucial module of salary incentive mechanism design. And then further analyzes the development course and current situation of the salary incentive mechanism, and the current development of the policy environment of long-term incentive mode. On the basis of collected the annual report data of several small and medium-sized shareholding commercial banks and foreign commercial banks, compare and analyze the current compensation of the small and medium-sized shareholding commercial banks in China, thus conclude the existence of a series of problems of total compensation and structure. Then draw lessons from the internal incentive mechanism of commercial banks in other developed countries, clear the aspects of the compensation management that small and medium-sized shareholding commercial banks in China should be improved. At last, design a more perfect salary incentive mechanism according to the enlightenment.The full text is divided into six parts. The first part of introduction mainly introduces the research background, research significance, the domestic and foreign research present situation, the paper ideas and research methods, innovations and limitations of this article. At the beginning of the second part, we define the concept and divide the structure of the keywords of the article, then introduce some famous incentive theories, getting a lot of enlightenment about the salary incentive mechanism. It paves the way and sorts out the thought for the below analyses. The third part defines the concept of small and medium-sized shareholding commercial banks in China. And then introduces the evolution of salary system of shareholding commercial banks in China. The introduction of the policy environment is also indirectly explains the development prospect and direction of the bank. The introductions about the series of rules and regulations and banks pilot, provide the policy premise of exploring and designing long-term incentive. Then analyze China’s small and medium-sized shareholding commercial bank’s total salary system and structure. Through the analysis of China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong development bank, Huaxia Bank, Minsheng Bank, Ping’an Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, and a series of data of the five big state-owned banks, we can see intuitively characteristics and problems of salary incentive for shareholding commercial banks in China. This part finally combines the analyses of the above, summarizes the problems existing in the shareholding commercial bank salary incentive mechanism, including executives and ordinary workers, lays the foundation for the design of the below. The fourth part lists the famous foreign commercial banks’ internal incentive mechanism, providing economic compensation and the non-economic compensation experience. The fifth part combines the current policy environment, problems pointed out above with the design experience of famous commercial banks’ compensation, to analyze the salary incentive mechanism of executives and ordinary staffs in China’s small and medium-sized shareholding commercial banks. By the end of the article sums up and analyzes the full text, I hope I can make persistent efforts in the research, and make a breakthrough.