Research On Energy Sanctions Of The Unites States And EU To Russia Since The Ukraine Crisis

From the end of 2013, Ukraine issues have gradually changed into the confrontation between the United States, EU and Russia, the relationships of whose have fallen to the lowest level since the cold war. All have taken a variety of political and economic and military measures to fight for their own interests. In order to force Russia to compromise on the Ukraine issues, the Unites States and EU have imposed several rounds of sanctions on Russia. Among these sanctions, energy sanctions direct at the core area of Russian economic development and have direct or indirect impact on the Russian economic development. According to the changes in the intensity of energy sanctions and the occurrence of critical events, the whole process of energy sanctions can be divided into three stages, symbolic stage, substantive stage and gradual stagnation stage, and based on this it analyses the relationship between the United States, EU and Russia.The first chapter focuses on the analysis of symbolic stage. There are three characteristics:first, the United States led the energy sanctions and also was the main force, while sanctions didn’t involve the core business of Russian energy sector, and the intensity was weak; second, because of close energy relations, energy sanctions of EU would be more effective, while EU tried to avoid the energy sanctions. The United States had to been urging EU to join the energy sanctions; third, sanctions were mainly assets freeze and the effect was not obvious. The second chapter focuses on the analysis of substantive stage. Because of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 crash, EU’s demand for political security was becoming more important than the worries about economic losses, most EU Member States began to advocate energy sanctions and EU gradually became the main force of energy sanctions. Since the United States and EU began a joint sanctions on Russian energy, sanctions added a ban on the export of energy technology to Russia. The effect of sanctions was hindering the future development of Russian energy sector, and further damaging Russian economic development. A case study of Rosneft was described. The third chapter focuses on the analysis of gradual stagnation stage. Although the United States and EU especially the United States have stressed the need to increase sanctions intensity, energy sanctions started at a standstill. Because the existing energy sanctions have adverse consequences to EU Member States and the new Minsk agreement was signed, most EU Member States are reluctant to increase sanctions intensity, and they want to maintain the existing energy sanctions to urge Russia to put the agreement into action as soon as possible. In the whole process, energy sanctions aim at the future development of Russian oil and gas industry, and is a selective sanction.In response to the energy sanctions of the United States and EU, Russia have taken several anti-sanctions measures. The fourth chapter focuses on the analysis of Russian anti-sanctions. With the changes of energy sanctions intensity, Russia is changing the anti-sanctions as well from warning into direct restrictions on imports of agricultural products of the United States and EU, and taking various measures to split the EU, for example using appropriate compromise and strengthening economic cooperation to draw part of the EU Member States to weaken momentum and intensity of the EU sanctions on Russian energy. The long-term cumulative economic contact between Russia and EU provides convenience for the draw, but also leads to Russian energy exports relying on the EU market. In order to alleviate the pressure caused by the United States and EU energy sanctions, Russia also actively changed the energy development strategy, for example developing the energy relations with Asian-Pacific countries to increase energy export diversification. Obviously, Russian anti-sanctions aim at the EU, and also don’t want to use energy weapons.From this analysis it can be seen that the joint economic sanctions of the United States and EU is more mature, which can directly target a single sector. Although the sanctions on Russian energy sector has greatly increased the economic cost of the Russian action in Ukraine, it’s unlikely to force Russia to back off Crimea. And because of the close energy relations between Russia and EU, EU is in the key positions in the whole process of energy sanctions. Both the United States and Russia are drawing EU to make decisions that are more conducive to their own interests. Under the game of various political or economic interests, the energy sanctions and anti-sanctions are in a state of mutual concession as a whole.