Research On Coordination Of "Scenic Spot+OTA" Dual-Channel Supply Chain Based On Contract Theory

With the rapid development of "internet+","internet+spot" mode has emerged in the tourism industry.The traditional travel agency sales mode has been put on the OTA(Online Travel Agency).Tickets for scenic spots on OTA are cheap and convenient to purchase.More and more tourists are willing to purchase tickets through online channels.As the decision-making behavior of scenic spots and OTA will maximize their own interests from the perspective of self-interest,it will lead to a decline in the revenue of the entire supply chain.In order to increase scenic spot profit,OTA profit and total profit of the supply chain.Based on the decision-making model of "scenic spot+OTA" dual-channel supply chain,this thesis establishes a coordination model of "scenic spot+OTA" dual-channel supply chain based on the cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract,in order to achieve supply chain coordinationFirst of all,a decision-making model of "scenic spot+OTA" dual-channel supply chain is constructed and the optimal profit of scenic spot,OTA and supply chain under the decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making is obtained.The optimal profit of scenic spot and OTA under the master-slave of Stackelberg and Nash are compared,and the optimal profit of supply chain under the decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making is also obtained;Secondly,based on the contract theory,the coordination model under Stackelberg master-slave game is established,and the scenic spot optimal profit,OTA optimal profit and supply chain optimal profit under cost sharing contract and revenue sharing contract are obtained,and the optimal profit of the three under the two contracts is compared.Finally,a series of conclusions obtained from the decision model and the coordination model are verified by the numerical simulation method combined with actual cases.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)Supply chain profit under centralized decision is larger than that under decentralized decision,which is the supply chain profit under centralized decision is larger than that under Nash equilibrium game,and the supply chain profit under centralized decision is larger than that under Stackelberg game.(2)Under the cost-sharing contract,the supply chain coordination can be realized when the value of cost sharing factor is[0,?/b].(3)Under the revenue-sharing contract,the value range of the revenue sharing factor is[(4?)/a,1].At the same time,supply chain coordination can be realized.(4)When the value range of the cost-sharing factor is ??[0,(m?)/?],the coordination effect of supply chain under the cost-sharing contract is better than that under the revenue-sharing contract.