Game Analysis Of Farmer、Cooperative And Leading Enterprise Under Traceability Regulation

Through the information recording and entity tracking, food traceability system can monitor and management the whole process of food “from farm to dining table”. So food traceability system is considered to be the effective way to solve the problem of food safety.At the beginning of the 21 st century, the European Union introduced the legislations and regulations on food traceability at first, requiring the food transacted in the domestic market must be traceable, and imported food must also meet the corresponding requirement for traceability. Subsequently, the United States, Japan and other developed countries also have introduced laws and regulations about food traceability.Agricultural products as the source of raw materials of all food, the importance of its safety for food quality and safety is self-evident. Therefore, it is urgent to study the traceability system of agricultural products supply chain. The main work of this paper is as follows:(1)For the agricultural supply chain of “leading enterprise+ cooperative+ farmer” mode,firstly, studying the behavior selection about whether implementing traceability system of farmers between internal cooperative by evolutionary game on the basis of considering the effort and penalty cost, and analyzing the influence of government regulation on their behavior selection. Then, analyzing the behavior selection about whether implementing traceability system between the cooperative and leading enterprise with evolutionary game under the presence of “free-riding” benefit and effort cost, as well as the impact of government regulation on the evolutionarily stable strategy.(2)Analyzing the impact of traceability on the effort and profit level of agricultural supply chain corporate through the simulation experiment.The results of this paper show that:(1)Effort and penalty cost directly affects the farmers’ behavior selection on the implementation of traceability system, and in order to curb the occurrence of “free-riding”behavior, the punishment must reach a certain intensity. Appropriate subsidies gave to farmers that implement the traceability system and adequate penalties imposed on the “free-riding”farmers by the relevant government department can encourage farmers to implement the traceability system actively, and then improve the quality and safety level of agricultural products.(2)The behavior selection between cooperative and leading enterprise is related to the initial state of the two parties, the input and output of implementing the traceability system,the benefit of free-riding and so on. When the benefit of free-riding is more than implementing the traceability system, the corporate enthusiasm to implement traceability system will be greatly reduced. In this case, in order to protect the safety of food and consumers’ health, it has to rely on government to impose adequate penalties on free-riding behavior. If the benefit of implementing the traceability system of the cooperative or leading enterprise is small, then the government should give its appropriate subsidies to encourage them to implement the traceability system actively.(3)Improving the traceability of any link will improve the effort level in all aspects of thesupply chain, thereby increasing the level of food safety. With the improving of the traceability, the profit of leading enterprise increased, while the farmer’s reduced, and along with the traceability enhanced, the profit of the whole supply chain decreased at the first beginning, then increased. When the leading enterprise for consumers as well as the cooperative for leading enterprise is fully traceable, the revenue of the whole supply chain is approximately the same as that of the non-traceable, but the quality and safety level of the agricultural products is greatly improved.