Study On The Relationship Between Executive Promotion And Earnings Management In State-owned Enterprises

Earnings management and executive promotion is an important problem in the field of corporate governance. In recent years, a series of executives of state-owned enterprises limited introduction of salary, the executives of state-owned enterprises not only care to pay explicit incentive, more attention to promotion incentive based implicit incentive. State-owned enterprises relates to the interests of the country and the broad masses of people, with the country’s political, economic, social development need closely together, and earnings management behavior not only reduces the quality of accounting information, but also directly affects the interests of investors and capital market sustainable development. Therefore, it is necessary to prevent the executives of state-owned enterprises through earnings management to personal post promotion, cause of state-owned assets loss and benefit related Therefore, it is of great significance to study the relationship between executive promotion and earnings management in state-owned enterprises.This paper on executive promotion and earnings management related concept and scope is defined, with principal agent theory, asymmetric information theory,implicit contract theory as the theoretical basis, discusses the executives of state-owned enterprises promotion impact on corporate earnings management mechanism. On this basis, select recent promotion executives of state-owned enterprises as the research object, establish executive promotion impact on earnings management of the multiple regression analysis model, to executive promotion and earnings management. The empirical test. The study found that the:(1) state executive promoted the whole to increase the extent of earnings management of enterprises.(2)executives of state-owned enterprises promotion that year and promotion of enterprise surplus tube The adjustment direction is not consistent. Executive promotion year profit to reduce the negative earnings management behavior, the promotion after a year will be of positive earnings management behavior.(3) compared with the internal promotion executives, external promotion executives in the promotion of the year will take the greater magnitude of negative earnings management. In the promotion after a year will amplitude greater positive earnings management. Finally, according to the conclusions of theoretical analysis and empirical research, from the state-owned enterprises internal and external control mechanism put forward corresponding countermeasures and suggestions, to improve the executives of state-ownedenterprises promotion mechanism, suppress SOE high tube for promotion of earnings management behavior.