Research On Organizational Executive Ability Based On The Principalagent Of State Owned Pharmacutial Company

Since 21 st century, albeit many enterprises have been equipped with good strategies,sufficient funds, advanced technologies, they have been defeated in the market competition. One main cause of this failure is that these companies execute at a relatively low level. Agent relations exist among each management echelon in modernized enterprises, and there may be some traits, including the inconsonant goals,and incomplete contracts, agents cannot work in accordance with the best effectiveness of consignors. This essay will research the thorough management structure of legal person in a corporation, the relationship of agents among different echelons in state-owned pharmaceutical businesses, and how consignors design supervision and stimulate system in order to improve executive force and then reduce the cost of agency.Based on relevant theories of agent and executive force and under the premise of the establishment of the principal-agent relationship, this study constructs a framework of the relationship between executive forces and the supervision and stimulation. It puts forward several hypotheses, including the hypothesis of economic man, the hypothesis of information asymmetry, the inconsistent utility targets, the uncompleted contract of the principal agency, and the uncertainty of the behavioral result.According to the theoretical model, with the increase of the supervision force, the executive level rises at first, and then starts to decrease after reaching the peak, which means that there should be a perfect level of supervision. By neglecting the change of the cost of principal agent, this paper studies the influence of stimulation to different proxy under the assumption about human nature. It proposes the concrete measures of supervision and stimulation in allusion to the present stage of the state-owned enteritis.At last, on the basis of the study of theoretical model, a particular pharmaceutical firm is empirically analyzed. According to its actual data and designed model, combined with the theoretic model, the surveillance dynamics is worked out, as the companies reach the highest executive level. According to the result, there is an analysis as to whether deputies carry out incentives.In conclusion, the principal-agent relationships exist between all levels of the state-owned pharmaceutical companies, and the main solutions to this issue could be the supervision and stimulation. The model could help decide the optimal supervision and whether to implement incentive and to provide reference for the actual work.