Sino-U.S. And Missile Technology Control Regime

Since the 1970s,many countries in the world have begun to research,develop and transfer missiles.As the United States lacked a reliable missile intercept ability,meanwhile knowing that its own power alone could not solve the problem of the proliferation of missiles and their technologies,it decided to launch a multilateral conference to control the proliferation of ballistic missiles.After several rounds of secret talks,in April 1987,the U.S.-led "G7"(the United States,the United Kingdom,France,Italy,West Germany,Canada and Japan)publicly announced Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR)at the same time,which attempts to mitigate the further spread of missile by limiting the application and development of missile technologies,missile components and complete missile systems.Although China has not been involved in the original consultation process of MTCR and is not yet a member of MTCR,China's relationship with MTCR is still very important.Because China is one of the permanent members of United Nations Security Council with legitimate possession of nuclear missiles and always has contradictions and conflicts with Western Powers headed by the United States in this issue.Due to the external pressure of the United States,the development of MTCR itself,China's nonproliferation policy changes in accordance with the change of national interest cognition and others,China's policy towards the MTCR from the beginning of the refusal to gradually adjust to adapt to now actively seeking to join the MTCR.In the previous study of international regimes,research in the fields of economy and culture is common,but the research in the field of security is less.(Because the security field is directly related to the survival of the state and any country is not dare to take it lightly,the security cooperation between countries is more difficult to carry out and the related materials are less.)Through the in-depth analysis of MTCR as an international security regime,this thesis not only helps us to better understand the gains and losses of China's accession to MTCR,so as to make the best choice in line with our national interests,but also contributes to better participate in economic,cultural,energy,environmental and other international regimes or even create them.This thesis is divided into the following six parts:The introduction of this thesis mainly studies the history of academic research,introduces the research topic and narrates the present situation of research,the research method,the research significance and the organizational structure of this thesis.The first chapter introduces the background of MTCR and identifies that it is an international security regime.Firstly,this chapter makes a detailed description of the background and main contents of MTCR.Secondly,this chapter clarifies MTCR as international security regime and establishes the theoretical framework to analyze and evaluate it.The second chapter explores the core regime of the missile field MTCR and discusses other existing norms of missile nonproliferation.Firstly,this chapter describes in depth the development of MTCR since its establishment.Secondly,this chapter makes a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness and shortcomings of MTCR.Lastly,this chapter discusses the existing norms of missile nonproliferation,including the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation(ICOC),the Proliferation Security Initiative(PSI),Global Control System for the Nonproliferation of Missile and Missile Technologies(GCS)and the United Nations Panel of Government Experts(UNPGE).The third chapter focuses the game process of China and the United States on the follow-up of MTCR.Firstly,this chapter outlines the policy of China in the field of missile nonproliferation,pointing out that China has developed and introduced a series of rules and regulations to control the export of missiles and its related materials since the 1990s.Secondly,this chapter reviews the practices and countries that China's missiles export and transfer.Lastly,this chapter analyzes the game process of China and the United States on the follow-up of MTCR,which clearly shows that China gradually changes its policy towards MTCR in the game process,reflecting the important role of the United States in China's treatment to MTCR from the beginning of boycott,criticism to limited acceptance and then to subsequent positive integration.The fourth chapter explains the reasons for China's policy change on MTCR from internal and external factors and puts three suggestions for China to join international security regimes.Firstly,from the internal factors of changes in national interest cognition and internal arms control and nonproliferation communities' development,this chapter analyzes China's choice to gradually integrate into the MTCR.Secondly,from the external factors of the globalization and the influence of the United States,this chapter analyzes China's choice to gradually integrate into the MTCR and clearly points out that the change of China's national interest cognition is the fundamental reason for the change of China's policy.Lastly,this chapter puts three suggestions,including strengthening international security mechanism research and training military control professional personnel;promoting multilateral consultations and cooperation and being a responsible country;establishing new security concept and providing China's initiatives,in order to better help China integrate into international security regimes.The conclusion of this thesis puts forward the possible suggestions to improve and develop MTCR and hopes that China can better integrate into and even create an international regime in line with global common interests in the future.