Research On The Supervisory System Of Leasing Farmers' Contracted Land

The reform of transfer in rural land contractual management rights has accelerated by“rights-identifying and certificating” and “rights-returning and functions-endowing”, which results in more and more enterprises have turned their eyes to agriculture. However, although the enterprises have brought capitals, advanced agricultural technologies and management models, which is helpful for modernizing agriculture, some problems also arise at the same time, such as occupying lands unfruitfully, claiming subsides, “non-cultivation” and“non-food-producing”, and even a change of land circumstances in existence. All these will squeeze the employment space and harm the rights of farmers. Among the forms of industrial and commercial capitals into agriculture, leasing farmlands by agricultural enterprises is directly involved in farmland cultivation. Compared with other forms, this model, closely connected to agricultural production, is easier to cause non-cultivation of lands and damage of farmers' rights. Thus it is completely necessary to design a strict legal system which supervises the leasing of farmlands by agricultural industries.The thesis consists of five parts as follows:The first part classifies relevant concepts in leasing of farmers contracted land by agricultural enterprises. The meanings and connotations of these concepts are clearly identified, such as agricultural enterprises, farmers contracted land, leasing of farmers contracted land and supervisory system of leasing of farmers contracted land by agricultural enterprises.In Part two we will discuss the theoretical basis of leasing farmers contracted land by agricultural enterprises from the perspectives of market failure, land-use control and power rent-seeking. Details will focus on power rent-seeking by government's main supervisory bodies and the uneconomical phenomenon of agricultural enterprises in management, and it is proposed that they are due to a lack of self-monitoring system and over-extension. While in the leasing process, the benefits of both parties may be damaged as a result of unbalance of information and external factors, which may account for non-agriculture of lands and worsening of land economy. Based on the Incentive Compatibility Constraints, it is suggested that the agricultural enterprises may be motivated by incentive measures to confront itsbenefits with the supervisory bodies, thus giving a feasibility of supervising leasing of contracted lands.Part three generalizes the legal supervisions of leasing of farmers contracted land,document of policies and local practice examples in China. By summarizing relevant regulations and legal rules, it discusses some key problems in current supervisory systems such as unsound supervisory basis, function missing of government supervisory bodies and imperfect supervisory system.Part four firstly introduces the legal supervisions of leasing of farmers contracted land by agricultural enterprises in Japan, France and Germany. It is hoped to learn lessons from the practices of these countries by examining their supervisory regulations and systems.The final part proposes to establish a supervisory system of leasing of farmers contracted lands by agricultural enterprises from regulation basis, supervisory bodies and supervisory mechanism with a consideration of practical problems and lessons in other countries. It is advised that this legal system can be understood by logic of the essence requirements of the prior access, continuous regulations and risk prevention after events. In accordance with this,the system is supposed to contain subsystems of qualification examination and approval,upper-limiting line control, classifying and recording, and risky funds. In the end, suggestions are given to better supervision supporting systems of registration farmers contracted lands,social welfare guarantee and service for farmers.