The Strategy Choose Of Terrorists' Behavior In Extreme Situation And Government Behavior Optimization

Terror incidence is increasing continually in new century,which seriously threaten social safety in each country.To defend terror is more difficulty since the network of terrorism,which make terrorists help each other in different region.Even terrorists in China show a scene of directors outboard attacks inland,Which scene is a challenge in our country.Above this,it is important to analyze terrorists'behave.Terror used to happen in extreme circumstance,traditional game theory hardly fit with terrorists'behavior prediction in real world because of the hypothesis of rational economic man.In anti-terror,terrorists have clearly situation decisions,even irrational decisions,their behavior hardly think about to maximize revenue.In this paper,we main break up the the hypothesis of rational economic man,analyze terrorists' behavior cause and government behavior optimal in some irrational conditions.In the process of defend and anti-terror,the terrorist have a over-balanced optimistic adventure before attack and have an pessimistic and desperate emotion even give themselves up after countries toughly attack.The anti-terror also have a over-balanced optimistic because of the underestimate about the severe anti-terror situation and have an anxious emotion when facing 'new pessimistic doctrine'because terror spread in new ways.In reality,terrorists have a more significant trait of surrounding decision and even irrational decision.Aiming at terrorists and government irrational behave in decision make a error in government defending decision,in this paper,we are based on Rank-Dependent Expected Utility,analyze how emotional factor influence traditional equilibrium when terrorist and anti-attack subjective probability have a optimistic or pessimistic expectation,improve anti-terror management with the result.It turns out,when one of two parts exists optimistic or pessimistic factor,the other part who can predict the incidence probability accuracy will adapt to the strategy equilibrium probability,namely one of two sides has emotional factor will influence the opponent's choose.When both of two sides have emotional factor,terrorist will incline to adapt to adventure strategy if he has a optimistic emotion,as a result,it causes a great uncertainty.Maynard Smith offered a new game theory to analyze social complex issues evolution when they analyze biological population evolution,researcher no more see a person as completely rational one,but a person who accept a learning rule to evolve.Limited reason of terrorist show a "learning reinforce " when acting,aiming at terrorist behave strategy change by anti-terror defending,in this paper,basis on the framework of game theory,we introduce a model called "generalized reinforce learning" to demonstrate in continuous time terrorists' learning behave rule,evolution process,spread speed if terrorist obey this rule.It proves that terrorist will not only increase the attack probability in the next time but terror spread in group faster if terrorist satisfied with their revenue last attack.Terrorist will reduce attack probability if he loss sever in last attack,but even having a big loss late time terrorist still makes an attack choose if he think highly expect revenue this term.As a result,government defending plays an important role in controlling attack incidence and suppressing the terror spread.Defending terror is not restricted to one country only because the global network distribution of terror,it should be put hand to region.The new trait of terror is net distribution global,terror behavior analysis cannot limit in terror attack level in our countty,we should pay more attention to analyze terror attack level in world.Terrorists in world offer military,strategy,material assistance to terrorists inland.Aiming at terrorist conducting outland acting inland in China,in this paper,we establish a game between terror aboard and national anti-terror organization and a zero game between terror inland and government,which two games form a Bi level programming.The double game can be expressed as Stackeberg(Von Stackeberg,1952)the leader-follower model.As a leader,terrorists in world obtain the optimal attack level at the first time by game with anti-terror on world,as a follower,terrorists inland game with our government according to terror attack in world.In this paper,analyze terrorists' behave traits whatever inland or outland and its influence factor,obtain government optimal defending level in circumstance of terror linkage outside and inside.It proves that terrorist inland optimal strategy is affected by terrorists' behave outland,ratio of effective defending and the attack cost.Government optimal defending strategy is sum of terror optimal strategy inland and outland.In this paper,we aim to analysis in extreme condition terrorists are affected by'emotion' irrational factor,and then cause the government optimal defend level transformation,terrorists are affected by limited ration 'learning rule',then cauce their behavior transformation,terrorists are assistant by the outside ones,then cause the government optimal defend level.Each factor links with each strategy.But in real,terrorists psychological activity is hard to depict,each activity cross another one and terror attack often happens in extreme circumstance,it's necessary to consider more factor such as terror politics and religion when to depict terrorists behavior.