Constitutional Practice Of Virtues

The question of “what is law” has been the theme of Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudence as well as of his moral reading of the American Constitution.In virtue of constructive interpretation guided by the conception of law as integrity,the moral reading interprets the Constitution,its bill of rights in particular,as the expression of principles of political morality.Yet it does not follow that by doing so moral reading simply defines political rights such as liberty or equality in light of political morality.Instead,moral reading claims that there are internal goods in constitutional practice,that is,the “living well” and “good life” of individuals in political community.And law as integrity requires practitioners of the Constitution to confer a narrative unity,coherent in principle and towards the ethical ideal of “living well” and “good life”,to the practice of constitution rather than deem it as discrete legal rules.Together,these two features of moral reading endow the liberty and equality with the identity of “political virtue”.In other words,liberty and equality are no more deontological rights,but qualities that a political community seeking for goods internal to constitutional practice must possess.Hence,the practice of the American Constitution is a practice of “virtue”,which signifies the revival of classical virtue ethics in modern politics.The aim of this thesis is to illuminate the way in which moral reading turns the Constitution into a constitution filled with virtues.To fulfill such an ambition,this thesis will unfold its arguments progressively from the starting point of the hermeneutics of moral reading.The first sector of the thesis expounds that the moral reading of the American Constitution is one form of constructive interpretation in constitutional practice.Such hermeneutics embeds in the shift from semantic attitude to interpretive attitude,which derives the interpretation of “what is law” and is required by legal practice for the practice of law is an instance of social practice.And the conception of law as integrity is considered by Dworkin to be the best interpretation for the concept of law in American legal practice.On the basis of this concept of law,constructive interpretation strives for seeking principles justifying the existing legal and political practice.Specialized to the realm of constitution,this hermeneutics turns into the moral reading.The second sector formulates the history of the concept “virtue” in western philosophy.Beginning with the heroic society in Homer epic,it gives a general account of how “virtue” enjoyed its prosperity in ancient Greek ethics and has declined in modern political philosophy.This account of history helps to reveal the fundamental structure of the concept of virtue,and the lost of virtue in turn suggests the possibility of its revival in modern constitutionalism.Such possibility is identified by Dworkin in the unity of value constructed through “reflective equilibrium”.However,applying reflective equilibrium brings about a hermeneutical puzzle: “being” or “ought to be” of constitution,which is the moral reading on earth interpreting in reaching the above equilibrium? Attacking such a puzzle is the focus of the third sector.In fact,it is a misleading one,for moral reading as an ontological constitutional interpretation has radically eliminated the distinction between “is” and “ought” of any object during the course of interpretation.Arguments supporting this claim provide a general demonstration from philosophical hermeneutics for moral reading,and justify its hermeneutical validity.The last sector finally demonstrates that in light of moral reading,the American Constitution presents itself as a category of virtues.The demonstration starts with the core of the unity of value constructed by reflective equilibrium,the ethical ideals of living well and good life,and infer from them two political moralities or principles of legitimacy as “trumps”,i.e.government must show equal concern for the fate of every citizen and respect fully their ethical authenticity.Next,the thesis explains why liberties and equality are required by these principles of legitimacy,and in turn proves the “internal mean-end” connection between liberty,equality and individual good life.The internal goods of constitutional practice is thus confirmed,and the basis of liberty and equality shifts form right to good.As political virtues,they together sustain the acquisition by practitioners of internal goods in constitutional practice through the constitutionalnarrative unity towards ethical ideals.And cases and articles of the American Constitution indicate that the Constitution does offer a category of political virtue,its practice is genuinely a practice of virtues.