Study On The Design Of Equipment Procurement Contract Under The Market Structure Of Natural Monopoly

Equipment procurement market has outstanding natural monopoly characteristics,research how to design the optimal equipment procurement contracts,in order to improve quality and efficiency of equipment procurement,while mobilizing the enthusiasm of the contractor,to solve the "drag,drop,rise" and other issues for that particular market structure,equipment procurement system and mechanism for promoting change plays an important role.This paper reviews the use of agency theory,game theory,incentive theory,mechanism design theory and other modern economic methods to distinguish two different strength equipment purchase natural monopoly market structure,and were for different equipment procurement market structure,the optimal contract design.For equipment procurement weak natural monopoly market structure,the article that can be optimized by introducing competition contract design.Taking into account the information asymmetry factor,try to design a phased beforehand auction by introducing competition,"menu-style" contract,so that on the one hand to maximize the contractor can choose according to their preference for the type of contract their interests,on the other hand the purchaser also According to the contract the Contractor can identify the contractor selected type characteristics,reduce information asymmetry,and thus minimize procurement costs.For equipment procurement and strong natural monopoly market structure,the article that due to the demand for small,strong asset specificity,large sunk costs,costs subadditivity outstanding for temporarily maintain the monopoly of the use of incentive regulation to optimize the design contract.First consider the one-dimensional quality requirements under a single period simple case of optimal incentive contract design,and the best cost-sharing rate contracts were analyzed.Further equipment procurement for solving the existing "drag,drop,rise" problem,in-depth consideration of the multi-dimensional quality requirements,multi-stage and other more realistic,more complex situations Optimal Incentive Contract Design Regulation strength.