Executive Incentive,Anti-corruption And Enterprise Performance

Executive incentive is the eternal theme of corporate governance,and has always been the theoretical and practical attention.Around this theme,both at home and abroad have carried out a lot of exploration and research,specifically focused on the form of incentives,size and efficiency and so on,Especially whether executive incentives contribute to the improvement and promotion of corporate performance,but did not reach a consensus conclusion.Enterprise organization exists in a specific internal and external environment,environmental factors benefit to a large extent affect the relationship between executive incentives and corporate performance.Over the past 30 years of Reform and Opening up,China's economic have made great achievements at the same time also breed some discordant phenomenon,such as the prevalence of corruption.Corruption has a negative impact on enterprise performance from both inside and outside.On the one hand,the corruption of external society interferes with the resource allocation and management decision of the enterprise organization.On the other hand,the corruption inside the enterprise directly increases the agency cost,which has the adverse effect on the realization and promotion of the enterprise performance.Since the 18 th CPC National Congress,our government has vigorously strengthened anti-corruption work,and the internal and external environment of enterprise organization has been greatly improved.This provides a good opportunity for studying the marginal role of anti-corruption work in the relationship between executive incentive and firm performance.Based on the above background,this paper chooses 693 non-financial listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the sample from 2011 to 2016.Appling Principal-Agent theory,Executive incentive theory and Stakeholder theory,the author studied the relationship between executive incentive and firm performance and the regulatory role of anti-corruption between the two.In the study,the executive incentive is divided into short-term monetary incentives and long-term equity incentive,and to explore the impact of the two on corporate performance.Secondly,introduce anti-corruption variables in the underlying model,as environmental factors Proxy variables,to examine its regulatory effect in the relationship between executive incentive and firm performance.Finally,the research work carried out a robust test.Through the research,it is found that monetary incentive has no significant effect on the performance of the firm,and the increase of the annual salary has even reduced the short-term financial performance of the enterprise.The equity incentive has a positive effect on the financial performance and the market performance.It is worth noting that anti-corruption has obvious regulatory effect in the relationship between executive incentive and corporate performance,and it strengthens the positive effect of executive incentive on firm performance while weakening the negative effect on corporate performance.By contrast,it is found that the role of anti-corruption in the relationship between the two is mainly reflected in the relationship between monetary incentives and corporate performance,and anti-corruption work for the long-term market value of the role of the promotion is more obvious.