Study On Objective Incentive Contracts Of R&D Outsourcing Project Under Asymmetric Information

The tide of a new round of global industrial layout adjustment,which gives strong propulsion to the fast-growing China R&D outsourcing service market.With the service professional promotion,the demand of outsourcing gradually diversified,the technical level,reduce operational risks and explore the transformation and development have become important factors for enterprise contract,the value of outsourcing gradually enhanced.Although the development of outsourcing has shown a strong momentum of development,the problem of information asymmetry between the two parties will directly affect the original intention of the enterprise contract,causing all kinds of risk factors,leading to outsourcing projects can not reach the expected effect,and even terminating the project contract.As clients,in order to achieve each goals of R&D outsourcing projects,by reasonable and feasible design of contractual governance mechanisms can alleviate or avoid adverse effects of information asymmetry factor,and may be bringing the two sides to establish long-term cooperative relationship.The main research object of this paper is R&D outsourcing project target incentive problems under the asymmetric information.Aiming at service outsourcing information asymmetry,In this paper,we first analyze the realization of long-term outsourcing project relational contract,the relationship between discount rate,the weight of the value target and the earnings of the project,according to the product quality optimization problem of R&D outsourcing project,based on the quality cost model,we study how to improve the quality with minimal cost to pay.Finally,for the problem of information asymmetry in the process of R&D outsourcing,we analyzes the level of technological capability,the risk of technology integration and the mutual assistance of project and coping strategies.