Study On Contract Designing Of Service Outsourcing Under Asymmetric Information

In recent years, with the development of economic globalization, Service trade has gained dramatic development. Under the competitive market environment, as a new business model, service outsourcing can effectively improve the core competitiveness of the enterprise, more and more enterprise in favor of it and adopt it. Many developing countries are also obtained new opportunities with the expansion of service outsourcing market for development, at the same time, service outsourcing market competition due to an increase in the number of service providers becomes more intense.With the deepening development of service outsourcing business, some problems also appear, Some reasons results in termination of the contract between the buyer and vendor, which include the imperfect market, kinds of risks still exist, service outsourcing trade cooperation often come to the end due to a lack of clear responsibilities and obligations, which not only bring bad affects to the benefits of both parties, but also affects the reputation of both sides. And much of the responsibility and obligation are not clear is caused by the information asymmetry in service outsourcing, information asymmetry can also lead the occurrence of moral hazard and adverse selection, the service outsourcing transaction both sides, which establish a good long-term cooperative partnership, so it is meaningful to design an effective services outsourcing contract.Because of the existence of information asymmetry, there are many kinds of risks in the process of service outsourcing, in order to hedge the risks that may arise during the service outsourcing, based on the analysis of the characteristics and causes of asymmetric information, this Paper bring forward there solution that combining the formal contracts and relational contract to construct bilateral governance mode. On the basis of the principal-agent model adds with rewards and punishment mechanism, and will be expected to output as a result of the evaluation of service provider’s output measures, build a formal contract of compensation incentive model, reduces the transaction cost of clients. The service outsourcing transact both sides of the transaction process as a process of repeated game, and analyzed the decision of each process, to maximize total surplus value as the target, build the relationship model of the contract. Then respectively expounds the governance mechanism of formal contract and relational contract, by combining two kinds of contractual governance bilateral dynamic joint governance mechanism is proposed, for the service outsourcing transaction both sides established a good long-term partnership. At last, through the case analysis, we can further understand the asymmetric information risk factors which exist in the service outsourcing risk factors and the contract of the joint governance mechanism.