Analysis Of Interest Game In The Construction Of High-standard Basic Farmland

Over the past five years, with the implementation of 400 million-mu [a unit of area(=0.0667 hectares] high standard basic farmland construction tasks, high standard basic farmland construction vigorously carries out throughout China. Huge sums of capital makes powers pursuing profits in all aspects of society participate in high standard basic farmland construction, so that the contradictory interests of stakeholders involved in the project increasingly impact the management of high standard basic farmland construction. The handling and coordination of these interest conflicts not only relate to the successful implementation of high standard basic farmland projects, but also affect the relationship among the grass-roots party members, cadres and the masses and even affect social harmony and stability. It is of important research value and practical significance to explore and study the benefit coordination measures of high standard basic farmland project. Therefore, the thesis summarizes and categorizes the stakeholders in high standard basic farmland construction through the collation and analysis of literature studying land consolidation stakeholders, which is followed by an analysis of interest demands and benefit goals of core stakeholders, and the point needs further study is obtained via analyzing interest conflicts between each two core stakeholders. Then, combining with static game and evolutionary game theory, the thesis conducts a game analysis of interest conflicts between development organization and construction unit, between development organization and village committees, between village committees and villagers as well as those among multiple parties, and verifies the game theory model through cases studies and experimental simulation, analyzes and draws conclusions. Finally, from the viewpoint of the balance of interests, benefit coordination measures and suggestions concerning high standard basic farmland projects are proposed.The main conclusions in the theses are as follows:(1) Through the collation and analysis of literature studying land consolidation stakeholders, the thesis summarizes the stakeholders in high standard basic farmland construction, and defines them as the individuals or groups who can affect the realization of high standard basic farmland construction objectives or be affected in the realization process of high standard basic farmland construction goals. Moreover, through reference, the stakeholders in high standard basic farmland construction are summarized and categorizes into three types based on core, general and marginal, in which core stakeholders include: development organizations, construction units, village committees and villagers.(2) The thesis, in a novel way, carries out the game analysis of interest conflicts between development organizations and construction units from the perspective of constriction units' different costs, and the equilibrium results indicate that the supervision of development organizations on construction units is essential--establishing sound punishment mechanism by increasing punishment of moral hazards, clarifying punishment ways in the construction contract and requiring on-site demolition and reconstruction of substandard engineering requirements; reducing regulatory costs through the use of computer network monitoring, supervision preset special funds, etc. and building a good communication platform with the help of modern communication means in order to improve the regulatory effect of development organizations, reduce moral hazard and promote the successful completion of the project.(3) Analyzing the interest conflicts between development organizations and village committees based on the Evolutionary Game Theory, the evolution results show that development organizations' incentives for village committee can promote their active participation in the project: enhancing village committees' participation through involving high standard basic farmland construction into performance evaluation of village committees, reducing communication costs by establishing a monthly communication system of village committees on high standard basic farmland construction, and stimulating the village committees' enthusiasm, initiative and creativity via the establishment of special reward and punishment system concerning high standard basic farmland construction, so to offer a strong guarantee for accelerating high standard basic farmland construction.(4) Analyzing the interest conflicts between village committees and villagers based on the Evolutionary Game Theory, the study shows that cooperation of village committees and villagers will effectively promote the development of the project. Both sides need to focus on the formation of a good long-term cooperative relationship; village committees need to take the initiative to create a good communication environment, while the development organizations may establish cooperation incentives for village committees and villagers, prompting bilateral cooperation in a win-win manner.(5) The thesis, in an original manner, believes village committees' involvement in collusion has its objective factors through the game analysis of benefits of multiple sides from the perspective of village committees' collusion. Concerning the collusion behavior of village committees and construction units, development organizations should stimulate villagers' participation and restrict the collusion between village committees and construction units by broadening the channels for reporting with anonymity, encouraging villagers to participate in cash monitoring and reporting via incentives and other measures, increasing publicity and penalties for violations, promoting the government to build supervision and reward systems and so on; meanwhile, development organizations need to actively guide villagers involving in the acceptance of projects after completion, and combat cut corners, false engineering and other violations from the most effective way so to safeguard the project quality and legitimate rights and interests of all parties.