Research On The Mechanism Of Interest Conflicts And Coordination Of Different Stakeholders In The Rural Land Consolidation Under PPP Pattern

China is a large agricultural country,and agricultural production plays an indispensable role in China's economic development.With the development of social economy,traditional agricultural production methods have exposed the problems gradually of low education level of rural labor force,low level of agricultural mechanization and lack of agricultural funds,and according to the requirements of the "Opinions on Accelerating the Transformation of Agricultural Development Modes" and "Several Opinions on Implementing New Development Concepts and Accelerating Agricultural Modernization to Achieve Comprehensive Well-off Targets",china's traditional agricultural production methods need to be transformed into modern agricultural production methods urgently.Rural land consolidation projects(RLCP)can promote the practice of agricultural modernization by improving the conditions of farmland infrastructure,reducing the degree of land fragmentation,increasing the amount of cultivated land,and improving the quality of cultivated land.However,the government-led RLCP under traditional model has problems such as lack of project funds,low investment efficiency,and relatively limited participation of farmers.It is difficult to meet the needs of agricultural production and development of farmers.Therefore,it is urgent to explore a new model of RLCP.Existing practices have achieved significant results in applying the PPP model to RLCP.It can alleviate the government 's financial pressure,increase the income of farmers,increase project efficiency,and promote the development of agricultural modernization.Therefore,it is necessary to promote the implementation of RLCP under PPP model.However,because the RLCP under PPP model in China is still in the exploratory stage,the laws and regulations of the RLCP under PPP model are not perfect,resulting in low enthusiasm for agricultural industrializations to participate;In addition,there are many stakeholders involved in the RLCP under PPP model,and the conflicts of interest among various stakeholders are obvious.Therefore,this article uses stakeholder theory and game theory to analyze the interest demands and conflicts of interest of government departments,a agricultural industrializations and farmers,in order to provides corresponding reference for circumventing and resolving the conflicts of interest in RLCP and promoting the participation of various stakeholders in the RLCP under PPP model.Based on the existing research background and relevant literature research,this paper expounds the motivation and resistance of government departments,agricultural industrializations and farmers to participate in the RLCP under PPP model from the perspective of core stakeholders,and the interests in the project and the conflicts between them.Using game theory to construct an infinite round of complete information bargaining game model of agricultural industrializations and farmers on the rent of agricultural land circulation,and an evolutionary game model of government departments and a agricultural industrializations on project subsidies.By solving the model,obtained the stable strategy of the model and select typical projects for case analysis.In the end,this paper mainly obtained the following conclusions:(1)Combined with the detailed rules scoring method and Mitchell scoring method,this paper divides the stakeholders in the RLCP under PPP model into three types of core stakeholders,general stakeholders and potential stakeholders.The RLCP under PPP model includes three types of core stakeholders: government departments,agricultural industrializations and farmers.(2)There are two main game relationships among the core stakeholders in the RLCP under PPP model.One is the issue of rural land rents between agricultural industrializations and farmers,the other is the issue of project quality between government departments and agricultural industrializations.(3)In the bargaining game between agricultural industrializations and farmers,there are the conditions for maximizing the benefits obtained by agricultural industrializations and farmers: the bargaining game between agricultural industrializations and farmers ends in the first round.And according to the equilibrium solution of the bargaining game model,the rural land rent that the agricultural industrializations is willing to pay is directly proportional to the expected rural land operating income of the agricultural industrializations;the rural land rent that the agricultural industrializations is willing to pay is directly proportional to the subsidy given by the government;the agricultural land rent that the agricultural industrializations is willing to pay is inversely proportional to the cost that the agricultural industrializations plans to invest in the project;and the acceptable rural land rent by the farmers is inversely proportional to the wage income of the farmers.(4)In the evolutionary game between government departments and agricultural industrializations,the system evolution stability strategy of government departments and agricultural industrializations can be divided into three situations: The first is when the agricultural industrializations may choose the "low-effort" strategy or the "high effort" strategy,if the government departments chooses the “incentive” strategy for the largest net income,the government department and the agricultural industrializations will choose the “incentive” strategy and the “high-effort” strategy as an evolutionary and stable strategy;if the government department chooses the “incentive” strategy for the net income less than the net benefit when choosing the "non-incentive" strategy,the system has no evolutionary stable strategy.The second is that the agricultural industrializations always chooses the "low-effort" strategy as the optimal strategy,and then government departments and agricultural industrializations will choose the "incentive" strategy and the "low effort" strategy as an evolutionary and stable strategy.The third is that the agricultural industrializations always chooses the "high-effort" strategy as the optimal strategy,if the government departments choose the "incentive" strategy with the largest net benefit,the government departments and the agricultural industrializations will choose the "incentive" strategy and the "high-effort" strategy as an evolutionary stability strategy;if the government departments choose the "non-incentive" strategy with the largest net gain,the government departments and the agricultural industrializations will choose the "nonincentive" strategy and the "high-effort" strategy as both evolutionary and stable strategies.According to the research conclusions,in order to coordinate the conflict of interest between government departments,agricultural industrializations and farmers in the RLCP under PPP model,to improve the enthusiasm about participation of agricultural industrializations and the operational efficiency in the RLCP under PPP model,this article proposes the following policy suggestions:(1)Improve laws and regulations in the RLCP under PPP model.(2)For the rural land rents,government departments can adopt an annual increase system.(3)Establish incentive and restraint mechanisms in the RLCP under PPP model,increase incentives for agricultural industrializations to participate through the establishment of incentive mechanisms,and restrain speculative behaviors of agricultural industrializations by establishing restraint mechanisms.