China's Food Safety Regulation Performance Evaluation And Optimization Path

Food safety is not only related to the health of the masses,but also related to the healthy development of society.China’s current food safety accidents, constantly hit with the masses confidence in food safety.In the December 2013, release of " Chinese Social Development Annual Report(2013) ",in the overall social level, the lowest satisfaction followed by three price levels,food safety and environmental quality,which can be seen in the foot,China food safety situation has let down the people’s trust in the freezing point.With the increasing severity of food safety issues,government regulators have taken various measures to ensure food safety regulation.From the implementation of the effect,the momentum of frequent accidents on food safety issues has got a certain containment,but the overall situation remains very serious,effective solution to food safety issues,rebuild consumer confidence,long way to go.In this paper,regulation economics theory and institutional economics, information economics,game theory,econometrics,and other related principles,norms and empirical analysis using a combination of methods for China’s food safety regulations and optimize the performance of in-depth analysis of the path.Research ideas in this paper are as follows:Firstly,China’s food safety regulations theoretical analysis,from the perspective of public goods characteristics and discusses government regulation static equilibrium of supply and demand,clarify the regulatory system and operating mechanism at this stage of China’s food safety regulation on regulatory effectiveness and efficiency theory expounded.Secondly,from the perspective of game theory,based on government regulation agencies,food producers,consumers consider the interests of the three main game,and the establishment of a central government and local government,local government and food producers,production companies and production companies,producers and consumers into four groups of people involved in the game model,analyzes the reasons for China’s food safety accidents frequent.Again,select regulatory efficiency effects and regulation of the two indicators of food safety regulation performance evaluation.At the time of the regulatory effects were evaluated in the theoretical analysis,based on a VAR model empirical Chinese food safety regulation effect,and the impulse response analysis and variance decomposition;at the time of regulatory efficiency evaluation,data envelopment analysis(DEA)as analytical tools,from the perspective of the production efficiency of the efficiency of China’s food safety regulations in 1997-2012 were studied,and in the second stage by Tobit model regulations affecting the efficiency factors were analyzed.Finally,this paper proposes Chinese food safety regulation in the optimal path analysis and empirical research on the basic theory.The main conclusions are:(1) the food supply chain involves many stakeholders,the main result of the game between the interests of food safety regulation will affect the effect,according to the game relationship between the various stakeholders to further improve Chinese food safetyregulatory system can be improved China’s food safety;(2)in the long term,monitoring frequency and increase and improve the food industry labor quality punishment households times average can improve food sampling pass rate,improve food safety regulation effects,and increased food industry production is reduced food safety regulation effects.In addition,the impact of increased regulatory agencies punishment households on food sampling frequency of the maximum pass rate;(3)China’s food safety regulation is low overall efficiency,and is dominated by the low level of pure technical efficiency and uneven caused food after 2009 the overall efficiency of the safety of government regulation than the level before 2009.From the institutional factors,changes in regulatory legislation variables can contribute to food security of government regulation efficiency,and regulatory agencies variable effect on the contrary;while improving the food industry labor quality can improve food safety regulation efficiency;from regulatory behavior to see increased oversight frequency and punishment can increase the number of households efficiency of food safety regulation,but instead the role of food safety sampling rate.