Research On Revenue-Sharing Contract Of Closed-Loop Supply Chain With Extended Producer Responsibility

There are a large number of waste products are not recycled on the market at present, which cause serious resource waste and environmental pollution. In order to strengthen the recycling of waste products, improve the utilization rate of resources, and do good job in environmental protection, the whole society expect enterprises to undertake recovery responsibility. However, many enterprises don't regard the product recovery as the activity that increases core value for enterprises and negative treat it. In order to make enterprises bear the recycling responsibility, the EPR(extended producer responsibility) system requires producers to recycle waste-old products. Supply chain become the carrier of implementing the EPR system gradually, however, because the supply chain is made of different members who have different interests, which may lead the conflict of interests in the process of implementing the EPR system, causing the whole supply chain system in a state of disorder.Based on the above background, on the basis of research results at home and abroad, this paper quote revenue sharing contract from two perspectives that the profit maximization and the EPR system performance level maximization to research the coordination and incentive problems under the EPR system, which provides reference of decision-making for supply chain members, to stimulate the closed-loop supply chain members to implement EPR system, finally to promote the implementation of the EPR system in our country.This paper studies coordination and incentive problems of revenue sharing contract under linear demand and random demand in the closed-loop supply chain. Under linear demand, when the product sales influenced by selling price, and recovery volume affected by sales and the input cost of implementing EPR system, Under random demand, input cost of implementation EPR system, which has impact on product sales. on the environment of two kinds of demand, build the decision-making models that don't implement EPR system, implement EPR system, traditional and two-way revenue sharing contract under two goals of profit maximization and the EPR performance level maximization respectively, and discuss coordination and incentive effects of two kinds of revenue sharing contracts under the two goals in the closed-loop supply chain.Through the above research, this paper gets the conclusion as follows:(1) Whether under linear demand or random demand, the implementation of EPR system will bring more profit, so as to the supply chain members should implement EPR system activity.(2) Under the implementation of EPR system, when the supply chain members to pursue goal of profit maximization, supply chain members to be able to get more profit. When the supply chain members pursue EPR system performance level maximization, guaranteed profit of supply chain changes between no implementation EPR system and implementation of EPR system, and the performance level of the EPR system decreasing with guaranteed profit increasing.(3) The same revenue sharing contract can realize the coordination of closed-loop supply chain under the two goals of profit maximization and the performance level maximization of the EPR system. And under the same income sharing ratio, the wholesale under the goal of performance level maximization is higher than that under the goal of profit maximization.(4) The traditional and two-way revenue sharing contracts can achieve coordination of closed-loop supply chain. Manufacturers can adopt different revenue sharing contract according to whether bring the sellers into the EPR system.