Analysis Of The Manifestations And Causes Of The Private Benefits Of The Executive Control Of China Southern Airlines

Since the adoption of the reform and open policy, state-owned enterprises(Soes)has developed very well and has become a pillar of strength Chinese country economic and social development. Along with the media exposure, executive compensation issue has become the focus of attention of the society. Government departments in this circumstance have taken some measures to resolve the problem,but still cannot achieve the symptoms, such as the salary limit. However, the salary limit is just a transitional reform measures. All sorts of problems the government needs to fundamentally solve the state holding listed company executive compensation. How to effectively carry out the salary incentive to the senior managers of the state-owned enterprises, improve the effect of the compensation incentive, improve the enterprise management performance, and maintain the security of the state-owned assets and become a problem to be solved.In the western mature capital market, research on the control of executive compensation also made a lot of achievements, but the research results about the salary manipulation, may not be fully applicable to the current is still in the stage of the gradual improvement of the capital market. As an incentive mechanism, executive compensation incentive is reduce agency costs, curb executives corruption. At the same time, the executive compensation incentive can play to promote corporate executives to enhance the performance of the company, but the incentive effect is affected by many factors, such as corporate governance and managerial power and accounting information quality.In this paper, by combining the relevant research results at China and abroad,based on the salary manipulation from the perspective of in-depth analysis on China Southern Airlines recent executive corruption, and contrast analysis method through case analysis, the salary incentive system and corruption of China Southern Airlines executives were analyzed, the results show that the situation in the absence of system construction, perfect the executive power is too large, the lack of incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism of scientific and effective internal control is not perfect, company executives may use their advantages of control to obtain higher performance pay, especially the decline in the performance of the company during the performance of senior executive compensation has not declined, but showing up in this trend, have greater rights of corruption involving executives is more obvious;further found in the executives agreed to manipulate performance Compensation to obtain more private benefits at the same time, the perquisite consumption of executives not only failed to reduce, but also showing a rising trend, and also found that executives of agency cost assumes the trend of escalation, agency efficiency was decreased. So it is only through a series of measures to strengthen the supervision and constraint of executive, further improve the pay incentive mechanism, and strengthen the internal control system construction, in order to effectively reduce executives use control right to grab the private benefits of behavior. This study not only helps to enhance government supervision departments, enterprises and academia for executives of listed companies how to use the control right to grab the manifestation of private benefits of understanding, but also improve state-owned enterprise reform and optimizing the compensation incentive system design provides a policy basis and theoretical support.