A Game-Theoretical Research On Credit Problem Of Sellers And Buyers In C2C E-commerce

With rapid development of the Internet, online shopping is everywhere. The development of C2 C e-commerce is especially rapid. It makes shopping more simple, convenient and fast, which greatly facilitate people's life. But compared with the traditional market, there are all kinds of information asymmetry in e-commerce market, exacerbating the uncertainty of commodity information, individual credit information, etc. Thus the integrity problem caused by information asymmetry runs through the whole process of C2 C e-commerce transactions, which restricts the development of e-commerce market. So the credit problem in C2 C e-commerce transactions is an important issue in the field of electronic commerce management.This thesis firstly introduces the status quo of the C2 C e-commerce transactions subjects' integrity, and carries on the analysis of the reason and defines the buyer's credit and the seller's integrity problems. Then according to buyer's credit problem, an evolutionary game model of buyer and seller is established. We discuss the causes of buyer's credit problem and seller's coping strategies. Then according to seller's integrity problem, imperfect information dynamic game models are established between the seller and the seller, the seller and the buyer. According to the result of equilibrium, the trading subjects can obtain the best behavioral decision under different conditions. Finally, from the perspective of platform regulators, systematically studied the trading subjects' integrity problem, through the establishment of a game model including three participants, based on the Nash equilibrium, discusses how the platform regulators and C2 C transaction subjects choose the best strategy. We find that trading agents can choose good faith transactions as long as the rules of the trading platform can be carried out.