Research On Quality Control Of International Engineering Project From The Perspective Of General Contractor

Chinese enterprises have developed rapidly in recent years and have gradually adjusted their development strategies to participate in international engineering projects with EPC model.At the same time,with the growth of corporate capital strength and the government's financial constraints,PPP+EPC model has gradually been favored by the government and enterprises.But regardless of which model,the project is completed by the general contractor and many subcontractors,both of which have important responsibilities to project quality.So the general contractor needs to strengthen their own quality control and subcontractor quality incentives to ensure the quality of international cooperation projects.Based on this,this paper first summarizes and analyzes the current situation of the supply chain quality control,and gives the content to be studied,that is,the game model is constructed and the quality and behavior of the two parties are analyzed considering the comprehensive ability of subcontractors and the negotiation ability of both sides.At the same time,it also gives a brief introduction to the theory of principal-agent,Nash negotiation and so on,which lays the foundation for the following research.Secondly,the paper analyzes the quality responsibility and behavior of the general contractor and subcontractor in EPC mode combined with the actual situation.Under the mechanism of general contractor and subcontractor sharing the punishment of owners,the quality incentive model of domestic EPC cooperation project based on principal-agent theory is constructed.We found that the optimal quality effort degree of subcontractors increases with the proportion of the owners' punishment,and there is optimal proportion of the total share to maximize the benefits.In addition,under the mechanism of the general contractor's commitment to the punishment of the owners,this paper constructs the quality incentive model respectively with no negotiation ability and certain negotiation ability of subcontractor based on the principal-agent theory and the Nash's theory of negotiation.The study found that comprehensive ability of contractors is stronger,the higher the optimal quality effort level;The general contractor has the optimum quality supervision to maximize general contractor quality income;The negotiation ability of both sides has nothing to do with the quality effort and the reward-sharing factor,but only with fixed payment.Furthermore,the paper further analyzes the quality responsibility and behavior of the general contractor and subcontractor in the PPP+EPC model,and constructs the quality incentive model based on the bilateral moral hazard.It is found that the optimal quality level of the.subcontractor is improved in the PPP+EPC mode,and the quality of international cooperation projects in this mode is higher than that of pure EPC model.Finally,the correctness of the analysis is verified by numerical analysis.And this paper puts forward six suggestions such as increase the quality control clause reasonably and the general contractor needs to strengthen the transition from EPC general contracting to EPC+PPP mode and etc.from the inside and outside two angles.