Research On Quality Information Disclosure Strategy In Supply Chain With Duopoly Retailers

This thesis investigates dual channel supply chain information disclosure strate-gies,wherein a manufacturer privately observes his product quality and delegates the sales responsibility to downstream retailers who possess the pricing power.Two models are introduced to research on this issue:1),two retailers are engaged in a Stackelberg competition;2),two retailers are engaged in a Cournot competition.The manufacturer can either disclose directly to consumers or indirectly through joint work with down-stream retailers.The research results show that the quality disclosure threshold under three disclosure formats related to disclosure cost.The research results show that in equilibrium both firms strategically select their disclosure options according to the disclosure costs and the ex-post quality level,thereby leading to some unintended phe-nomena.The retail price may decrease simultaneously when the disclosure cost goes up.More pay in the disclosure can help manufacturer generate a higher ex-post payoff once the product quality is sufficiently low.This thesis also examines the impact of disclosure costs on the supply chain's ex-ante payoff,and finds that it is maybe the best for the manufacturer to afford the entire disclosure costs in the dual channel.In other conditions,sharing disclosure costs can be beneficial for the manufacturer and the retailers.