Coal Mine Safety Supervision Research Based On Evolutionary And Reciprocity Game Theory

Coal mine production safety issues left the rapidly developing Chinese economy a lingering shadow for a long time, whether it is the frequency of occurrence of major accidents severely view or from the high casualty rate is concerned, its impact has exceeded the scope of safety production itself, rising to a matter of political and social stability, the overall height of building a harmonious society. Statistics show that since January1,2001to December31,2012, the size of coal mine production safety accidents occurred28,509in the country, the death toll reached50,975, up2.11million tons of coal mortality. Coal-based energy production, consumption structure and economic development has long been dependent on coal resources, coal makes security problems more attracted nationwide attention, like an invisible burden of pressure in the safety supervision department, major coal the provincial government’s shoulders. When one by one on the occurrence of coal mine safety accidents and external factors that cause their own analysis, we found that a series of incidents leading cause of coal mine safety are directed to the corporate security regulatory issues. Here includes not only their own regulatory safety oversight and safety self-inspection, more importantly, from th? coal mining enterprises independent regulatory power-government regulation.In this paper, the problem of coal mine safety supervision, the use of evolutionary game theory and reciprocity game and coal mine safety regulators game between enterprise security problems caused by mines. Specific studies include the following four points:First, the coal mine safety regulators and the game between enterprises as individuals, the use of reciprocity game theory research, analysis and monitoring of coal mining enterprises utility of reciprocity between agencies. The results showed that:the probability of coal mine safety accidents oversight capacity by third parties, illegal mining of coal mining enterprises and regulatory agencies excess earnings impact of regulatory costs. Therefore, to reduce the probability of failure of coal regulation of coal production and to improve the safety level of coal mine safety supervision, we should majorly reduce the cost of suppressing the illegal exploitation of coal to gain excess returns.Second, these papers established the game model of coal mining enterprises and government regulatory agencies and analyze cyclical evolution mechanism of coal mine production safety. Evolution of coal mine safety supervision system in mixed strategy equilibrium trajectory in a balanced attachment point as the center of the limit cycle; mine production safety supervision with cyclical fluctuations, the proportion of coal production accidents will also appear cyclical fluctuations.Third, combing the Qujing "11·10" cases of mine accidents numerical analysis, this paper analyze safety supervision of local government failure of the main factors combined value of coal mine production and set the upper limit of the accident rate, the impact of local government mine safety is the two main factors that failed to regulate the system evolution of the mixed equilibrium position (local government regulatory agencies misjudged mine violations overdraft income) and cyclical fluctuations in the amplitude (coal mining enterprises and local government regulatory agencies strategies initial).Fourth, this paper draws conclusions and proposes to promote some relevant coal mine safety supervision policy recommendations.Game theory studies abroad for both theory and research level and application level are mature, evolutionary game theory for the domestic research mainly focuses on the method of application level. In the coal mine safety supervision of the game, the main focus with the government and coal mining enterprises, there is no safe and economic stakeholders, according to a comprehensive summary and analysis, especially for coal mining companies and regulatory agencies on mutual utility game relationship between analysis and discussion. This paper analyzes the current problems of coal mine safety supervision, based on the use of game theory, evolutionary game theory and reciprocity in the coal mine safety supervision and analysis of the relationship with the reciprocity method of coal mine safety supervision, using an evolutionary game theory analysis of coal mine production safety accidents cycle fluctuations in the evolution mechanism, as well as leading local government safety failure of the main factors, and in accordance with the conclusions proposed to increase the effectiveness of coal mine safety supervision recommended countermeasures.