Effect Of Managerial Ownership On The Quality Of Voluntary Earnings Forecast

Listed company as one of the important players on the securities market,it has the responsibility to bore the burden of effective information disclosure,effective information disclosure is the precondition of investors interests are basic guarantee.Many listed companies in the securities market in China,however,failed to fulfill its basic duty,unable to safeguard the interests of investors.The companiesuse illegal means,such as income and profits inflated encouraged many investors,making investors caused great economic losses.Management as the actual controller of listed company disclosure selective informationwith subjective intention,is the result of the company management endogenous decision-making.The problem worthy of attention that management will take advantage of their position with more internal message for personal gain,thus damaging the interests of the shareholders.In this paper,under the background of management equity,earnings forecast as the proxy variable of information disclosure.Measuring the quality of earnings forecast information disclosurefrom three characteristics,namely the timeliness,accuracy and bias,and introducing two independent variables of management equity stake or not and managerial ownership,and study its impact on the quality of earnings forecast information.This article is divided into six chapters:Chapter one isbrieflyanalyzed the research background and research significance in the first,and on this basis,reviewing of domestic and foreign literature about the earning forecast motivation and characteristics,managerial ownership and the quality of information disclosure.scholars just disclosures external influencing factors but not the disclosure motivation from the management itself.Therefore,this paper analyzes the management's shareholding characteristics,based on the subjective intention of management,and studies its influence on the quality of information about voluntary earning forecast.The second chapter discussesthree theoretical basis about the principal-agent theory,asymmetric information theory and signaling theory and advances the two assumptions in this paper,namely under the condition of the management equity,voluntary earnings forecast information quality of listed companies is higher;The higher the proportion of managerial ownership the higher the quality of the information for the listed companies.The third chapter is the research design part,according to the above literature review and theoretical analysis,building six regression model from two assumptions.Selection of 2011-2015 on the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange data of A-share listed companies as research samples.Moreover,emphatically explained to the variable that the quality of earnings forecast information timeliness,precision and accuracy,and briefly explain some variables and control variables.Chapter 4 begins with a descriptive analysis,correlation analysis and regression analysis based on the selected samples,and then analyzes the regression results of each model.Empirical results show that the research hypothesis only get part of the validation,on assumptions,namely managerial ownership will improve the quality of voluntary earnings forecast information from timeliness,accuracy and precision;For hypothesis 2,the higher the level of managerial ownership,the better the quality of the earning forecast information.Finally,the model of the controlled variable equity concentration and the accuracy of earnings forecast to replace the explained variables,the test model robustness,robustness test shows that the empirical model has the stability and reliability.The fifth chapter is the part of the conclusion that based on the empirical test results,and then combined with the actual development of the earnings forecast system in China,puts forward policy suggestions.First of all,our government should introduce a guidance of voluntary earnings forecast;Second,listed companiesas the main body of information disclosure,are indispensable to the effective information disclosure quality evaluation system;Finally,the government should strengthen supervision and management of listed companies management,to control the level of management equity to ensure that the appropriate range performance forecast is not subject to manipulation,prompt management efforts to increase the adequacy of information disclosure,authenticity and accuracy.Then,the paper points out the shortcomings of this paper,and puts forward the future research direction.