Research On The Revenue Compensation Model Of PPP Project Of The Toll Road

The construction of toll roads not only can promote the development of regional economy,but also can further enhance the regional traffic location advantages,improve the investment environment,and provide strong support for the regional industrial layout.The toll road project belongs to capital and technology intensive projects,due to the long construction period and the complicated construction environment of the toll road in remote areas and the society's increasingly high construction and service requirements,relying solely on the provision of the government has been completely unrealistic.In recent years,the rapid development of the PPP model in the "franchise" approach will be part of the government expenditure responsibility transferred to the private sector,not only alleviates the government financial pressure,but also makes the private sector idle capital rational and effective use,therefore,for the toll roads,the introduction of PPP model can greatly promote its development.However,due to the characteristics of quasi public goods and positive externalities,the private sector is not able to obtain a reasonable return.At the same time,through literature research,we find that the current PPP project compensation model can only compensate the private sector's investment gap,and has no incentive effect on the private sector.Therefore,it is very important to establish an effective and incentive compensation model to provide protection for the smooth implementation of the toll road PPP project.In this paper,the methods of literature research,game analysis,and combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis are used to study the income compensation model of the toll road PPP project.First of all,this paper expounds the current situation of the development of toll roads of our country,and combs and analyzes the current situation of PPP compensation at home and abroad.Subsequently,this paper expounds the relevant theory of the revenue compensation mechanism of the PPP project of toll road,and gives the concept of toll road PPP project,and analyzes the four economic characteristics and the necessity of compensation for the PPP project of toll road PPP project,at the same time,game theory and principal agent theory are introduced,the principal-agent relationship in the compensation of PPP project toll road is studied,which paves the way for the construction of the theoretical model.Then,this paper describes the compensation problem of the PPP project of toll road,and introduces two kinds of compensation modes of the current PPP project compensation: the construction period compensation mode and the operation period compensation mode.In the case of clear government and private sector is the principal-agent relationship,borrowing from the principal-agent model to construct the principal-agent game model of revenue compensation of "fixed subsidy + incentive subsidy" under the two aspects of "fill construction" and "fill operation" from the perspective of quantitative analysis,and solving of the model and analysis,and discussing under symmetric information and asymmetric information the government gives private sector fixed subsidy,the relationship between theenterprise effort level and the government incentive,and the influence of enterprise risk aversion and external factors on the optimal compensation contract.and then from the theoretical analysis of the effectiveness and feasibility of incentive compensation mechanism.Finally,combining with practical cases,focusing on the situation of information asymmetry "construction" and "compensation operation" two compensation model for quantitative analysis,and puts forward the selection model based on the cost of compensation operation is the optimal compensation decision of government,according to the compensation model and the calculation results and put forward some compensation advice.