An Analysis Of Agricultural Products Supplier' Production Behavior Under The Influence Of Market Certification: An Evolutionary Game Perspective

Credence attitudes is a product feature that consumers cannot know the exact quality of products whether before or after purchasing.The health and safety of agricultural products have obvious credence attribute.As a kind of credence goods,the problems of information asymmetry in agricultural products markets is extremely serious.Certification system which is an effective signal transmission mechanism plays an important role on solving the problem of information asymmetry between consumers and agricultural product suppliers.However,the certification market exists the phenomenon of illegal certification and collusion certification while certification of agricultural products frequently broke out quality and safety accidents in the real life.The quality and safety of agricultural products is intimately related to the citizens' interests.In recent years,experts and scholars conduct multiple researches on the areas of agricultural product certification markets.This paper studies the following aspects on the basis of illegal certification and collusion certification phenomenon: why do illegal certification and collusion certification behaviors of certification constitutions exist? How do certification regulations effectively restrict opportunism behavior of agricultural products suppliers? Whether it effectively improve the phenomenon of marketing failure by introducing governmental regulations in the condition of certification regulations failure? What's the conditions for effective regulations.This paper points at the reality of illegal certification and collusion certification existing in certification institutions.On the one hand,it analyzes mechanism that certification institution's choice has an effect on production behaviors of agricultural product suppliers by establishing an evolutionary game model;On the other hand,it introduces governmental regulations into certification market and explores appropriate conditions and effect mechanism in the process of improving certification market failures under the policies of subsidy and punishment.The research reveals as following:(1)When the disguised cost for shoddy agricultural products is higher,the suppliers will always provide qualified agricultural products even if the certification authorities choose illegal certification.When the disguised cost of shoddy agricultural products is lower,certification mechanism cannot restrict agricultural opportunistic suppliers even if the certification authorities choose strict certification(2)The most effective method to guarantee the legitimacy of certification system is to reduce certification cost and ensure that the certification institution to make a profit.Meanwhile,if certification mechanism want to effectively restrict agricultural opportunistic suppliers,it is necessary to publish related regulations,increase the expected losing of agricultural products suppliers and avoid opportunism.(3)Whether certification authorities choose illegal certification or the collusion certification,the government set up punishment or subsidy policies on shoddy agricultural products based on the existence of voluntary certification regulations.When punished or subsided limits is reasonable,the total agricultural suppliers will choose to product qualified products in the markets.This paper aims at providing decision-making reference for government to deal with failed certification markets.Furthermore,it can keep illegal certification and collusion certification of certification authorities away and realize the development and improvement in Chinese certification market as well as avoid agricultural product suppliers providing shoddy products to ensure consumers' health and safety eventually.