Research Of Certification Mode Choice Based On Minimum Incentives To Collude

With the rapid development of China's economy,consumers are increasingly demanding higher product quality.However,the increasing complexity of product manufacturing process and the extension of supply chain make the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers more serious.So the importance of the third-party certification system with signaling effect is becoming more and more prominent.The prerequisite for the certification system to play its role is to disclose the real quality information.But in reality,due to the lack of perfect government supervision mechanism and some problems existing in the certification system itself,it is not unusual to see collusion between certification authorities and manufacturers to disclose the fake product quality information.Although the government has taken some measures to solve this problem,the effect is not satisfactory.Therefore,this paper starts from the difference between the compulsory certification and voluntary certification to analyze the influence mechanism of certification mode made on collusion.Then we present a theoretical model to compare the negative effect of collusion in two certification modes and put forward corresponding regulation measures.We present a model including certification authorities,manufacturers and buyers,through the analysis of certification strategy of manufactures,the information disclosure strategy of certification authority and the payment strategy of consumers,we analyze the market equilibrium characteristics of collusion and solve the precondition of collusion.We use the probability of collusion and information distortion as evaluation indicators to compare the collusion incentive between two certification modes.In addition,this paper also analyze the choice of certification mode based on Chinese certification market reality.First the results show that due to the lack of self-selection effect,the incentives to collude in mandatory certification is higher than in voluntary certification.Then a regulation which forces firms to be certificated should be associated with a maximum price far above the monopoly price to guarantee at least the same probability of collusion under voluntary certification.Finally,certification collusion is not inevitable,when the discount factor of the certification authorities is higher than a certain value,certification collusion will be completely avoided.