| With the accelerated pace of information and economic globalization,the competition among individual enterprises has been replaced by the competition between the supply chains.Only by strengthening the power of innovation and the strength so as to the enterprises have a foothold in the complex and changeable competition.Then the innovation information is related with the trade secrets and the core competitiveness of enterprises,so companies usually show the misreporting behaviors.The members of the supply chain have different effects of different false decisions which will have a significant impact on stakeholders.Exploring the misreporting motivation is conducive to enterprises to make the right decisions to improve their income as well as improve supply chain internal coordination and overall efficiency.Therefore,under the condition of asymmetry innovation information,considering the compensation the research of supply chain members' misreporting decision and supply chain coordination is significant.Under the environment of supply chain innovation,under the condition of supplier compensated by manufacturers,the two echelon supply chain model that the supplier and manufacturer respectively are the leader,using the method of theoretical analysis and numerical analysis and combining with the information asymmetry theory,game theory,supply chain contract and other related theories to study the behavior of misreporting for innovation information of supplier,and analyzes the impact that different strategies and coordination mechanisms is on supply chain performance in order to incentive supply chain enterprises to disclose innovation information honestly,and provide valuable reference for the coordination of the supply chain.First of all,a two echelon supply chain profit model of single supplier and a single manufacturer is established based on game theory and other theories about supply chain under the condition of innovation asymmetry combining the innovation compensation.The relationship between misreporting and innovation compensation and the technological disparity is discussed.Also,this paper analyzes the influence about the misreporting on the benefits of the whole supply chain and the supply chain members.Secondly,the Stackelberg model that contains suppliers with Bertrand competitive and one manufacturer is constructed on the basis of contents mentioned above The game results and the impact that is on the supply chain efficiency are discussed when the suppliers and the manufacture is the leader respectively.Then the relationship between supplier competition coefficient and misreporting is considered.And after comparing two optimal misreporting strategy and the profit of the supply chain when both of two suppliers take different misreporting decisions profile,the paper verifies the correctness of the conclusions by the method of numerical analysis.Finally,under the condition of asymmetric information,this paper uses the improved and traditional revenue sharing respectively to coordinate the misreporting behavior of suppliers on the one-to-one and two-to-one supply chain based on the innovation compensation policy considering the adverse effects of misreporting for innovative information to induce suppliers to report innovation information honestly and achieve the perfect coordination of supply chain when the single manufacturer is the leader.Then the feasibility and effective of RS-OL is verified using the method of numerical analysis.Because this paper only considers the misreporting decision of supply chain members in the single period,the supply chain enterprise's misreporting behavior will harm themselves and the interests of other members in a long time.In addition,the single revenue sharing contract is only used to coordinate the supply chain under the two-to-one mode of suppliers' misreporting,and the complexity and variability of supply chain is not considered,therefore the research of this paper needs to be further improved and perfected. |
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