Research On Wholesale Price Contract Of Supply Chain Under Asymmetry Of Fairness Concerns

In recent years,with the development of economic globalization and science and technology,the competition among the decision makers in the supply chain has become increasingly fierce.The research of supply chain contract has become a hot spot in the field of management science.Up to now,supply chain contract research is mostly based on the complete rationality of decision makers,that is,the decision goal is to maximize their own profits.But in recent years,a series of game experiments and empirical studies show that the decision makers in the supply chain not only pay attention to the maximization of their own interests,but also to the fairness of the profit distribution of the supply chain.That is,they not only have the self-interest preference but also the fair preference.Taking the wholesale price contract two-level supply chain as the research object,this paper studies the influence of asymmetric fair preference information on the decision making,profit and utility of the supply chain decision maker.And through the establishment of signal transfer game model to solve the problem of adverse selection under asymmetric information of retailer fair preference.The details are as follows:First,literature review.Based on the main body of this paper: the research of supply chain wholesale price contract under the condition of asymmetric fair preference information belongs to the supply chain contract problem under specific conditions.Therefore,according to the academic history of supply chain contract development,the existing literature is sorted out,that is,according to the evolution process of people's understanding of supply chain contract,the literature about supply chain contract is roughly divided into four stages.They are supply chain contract research under complete rationality;supply chain contract research under limited rationality;supply chain contract research under fair preference information symmetry;supply chain contract research under asymmetric fair preference information.Secondly,under the condition that the supplier's level of effort affects the market demand,the evolutional model of fair preference information is established.According to the structure of retailer's fair preference information,the game is divided into four stages.The results show that when retailers and suppliers are completely rational,wholesale price contracts can not coordinate supply chain contracts under decentralized decision.The retail price determined by the retailer is directly proportional to its own fair preference level,and is proportional to the fair preference level considered by the supplier when the information is asymmetric.Considering the retailer's fair preference behavior in supplier decision-making can improve the retailer's proportion in the profit distribution of the supply chain increase their own profit and the supplier's effort level can reduce the negative impact of retailer's fair preference on themselves and the supply chain.Thirdly,the signal transmission model under asymmetric fair preference information is established.The research shows that in the short term,the fairness preference information asymmetry will make the weakly fair preference retailers benefit,so that the Qiang Gongping preference retailers and the uninformed providers will be impaired,and the supply chain cooperation will have adverse selection problem.In the long run,asymmetric fair preference information will make strong fair preference retailers gradually withdraw from the market,a large number of weak fair preference retailers crowded into the supply chain,resulting in the supply chain of low quality.Finally,the problem of retailer selection and cooperation under asymmetric fair preference information is studied from the perspective of retailers' transmission of fair preference information.Through comparative analysis,it is found that different types of retailers don't choose to send signals when there is no difference in signal transmission cost,while suppliers can not identify the types of fair preference of retailers.Only when the retailer's signaling cost is different can the retailer's true fair preference type be displayed,thus solving the problem of retailer selection under asymmetric fair preference information.