Study On Restrained And Incentive Model Of Hybrid Multi-agent Network Credit Based On Game Theory

In the process of rapid transition from traditional economy to e-commerce economy,due to the asymmetry of information among transaction subjects,the network credit of hybrid multi-agent is concerned.With the diversity of the electricity market,this kind of problem becomes a research hotspot now.Based on the classical evolutionary game theory,this paper studies the decision-making problems of the main players in the electricity market.Based on the stochastic evolutionary game,this paper studies the credit information sharing problem of the electronic business platform,and puts forward a reasonable and effective credit restraint and incentive mechanism.First of all,this paper consider the classic C2C e-commerce model,due to the participation of the main body,low threshold of entry,C2C e-commerce model in the credit problem is particularly prominent.In this regard,as the main medium of e-commerce,electricity business platform credit regulatory responsibilities can not be ignored.In the C2C e-commerce model,the introduction of the electricity platform as a third party credit supervisor,based on the game theory,the establishment of complete information static game C2C model constraint incentive basic model,including the design to promote the integrity of the transaction mechanism and incentive mechanisms,Incentive to put forward two aspects of the initial regulatory recommendations to promote the healthy development of the Internet environment.Secondly,on the basis of the constraint mechanism model,the actual benefit of the game side in C2C mode is further materialized.A new C2B2C e-commerce can be extended from the typical C2C e-commerce by incorporating the transaction platform as a third party of credit supervision mechanism,in which security deposit policy,supervision policy and punishment policy are elaborately designed.Based on the evolutionary game model and the bivalent trading game model,the long-term trading strategies of merchants and consumers in the C2B2C e-commerce are investigated.The results indicate that enhancing security deposit,supervision strength and disguising cost will effectively avoid credit default in e-commerce.Finally,on the basis of the incentive mechanism model,this paper takes into account the interaction between electronic business platform.As the major media of E-commerce market,E-platforms can record the online trading activities of merchants and consumers,and thus their respective credits is effectively evaluated.Therefore,the sharing strategy of credit information among platforms can help improve E-commerce credit environment especially in China.In such a context,this paper builds an information sharing strategy game model based on evolutionary game theory,and employs the Moran process assuming a limited number of agents to analyze the corresponding random evolution,in order to explore the conditions for credit information sharing cooperation.The results strongly suggest reducing costs of processing shared data,enhancing penalties on noncooperation and developing reward policies for high-credit merchants,which helpfully facilitate convergence to a steady state of information sharing cooperation.Furthermore,the numerical experiment finely verifies the validity of the proposed model and the corresponding policy implications.