Regulation Research On Third Party Payment From The View Of Game Theory

The wide application of network technology promote the leap-forward development of e-commerce,and the third-party payment market also ushered in the golden age.The safe and fast payment system not only improves the efficiency of the commodity market and financial market trading,but also to be the market foundation of high-speed operation.As an emerging Internet financial form,third-party payment has some shortcomings,and even leads to higher risk.Such as network technology risk,money laundering,credit card cash out,network fraud risk,appropriate risk of customer cover,customer information leakage risk and so on.The third-party payment market in China started late but developed fast,and the corresponding regulation is imperfect.There is no specific law formation,but only measures for the administration of the people's bank of China issued without detailed rules.Mismatching between effective regulation and the development of the third-party payment occasionally has led to some unfair competition,customer information leak,the Internet continuous illegal and criminal activities,appropriate of customer cover etc.The existence of these problems not only hinder the healthy development of the third-party payment market,but also conducive to the realization of the whole financial stability.In the perspective of game analysis,this paper firstly established a game matrix between two third-party payment agencies.Through this analysis,any company will choose innovation under the temptation of excess profit incentives to occupy the market advantages,at the same time companies are free of regulatory.This requires that regulators keep up with the third-party payment mechanism innovation,constantly adjust,perfect the regulatory policy,promote the benign competition between payment mechanism.Secondly,set up a game model between regulators and payment institutions,we find the investment income of huge customer precipitation funds is the main incentive payment institutions irregular operations;The probability of payment institutions violations depend on the regulatory supervision cost and penalties;Major hazard regulatory gaps is a threat of customer rights and interestsprotection.Finally,through the analysis of the game model between regulators and the agency type mode,the cooperation costs exist inevitably form regulation vacuum or repeat regulation,so effective regulation need interconnection and interaction between regulators.On the basis of the experience of foreign regulation,combined with China's specific national conditions,to establish effective regulatory system,from the legal level,the relevant legislation should be actively improved;From the perspective of regulatory model,functional supervision is needed;From the aspects of supervision content,further explicit regulation object and regulation principles should be clear,the compliance of payment mechanism,liquidity,profitability and competition of the third-party payment market regulation index should be established and dynamically adjusted;From the aspects of regulatory measures,not only reasonable market access conditions and the market operation order,but also mechanism of exit channel should be perfect to protect the rights and interests of consumers.