The Research On The Government Supervision Of China's Third-party Payment Platform From The Perspective Of Game Theory

With the advent of the "Internet Plus" and "Big Data" era in the 21st century,and the widespread adoption of information network technology,the third-party payment market has ushered in a golden era:e-commerce "blowout" development,and the number of third-party payment agencies Geometric growth.Third-party payment,as a kind of emerging payment industry relying on the Internet,has solved the problem of distrust between buyers and sellers in the transaction process by virtue of convenient transaction procedures and innovative capabilities,and has won the favor of users.Regardless of the development of the level of technology or the efficient and practical performance,compared to traditional payment methods,third-party payment has unparalleled advantages and has greatly changed the way people consume.At the same time,third-party payment methods also bring about some risk problems,such as Internet money laundering risk,bank card cashing risk,technology risk,deposited capital risk,bad competition risk and so on.China's third-party payment market has started late,the development rate is very fast,but the corresponding regulatory system is not keeping up with the pace of development.It lacks a sound regulatory system,and the regulatory basis is mainly the rules and management methods issued by the central bank,thus,the legal hierarchy of which is low,the details are not perfect,it not only hinders the healthy development of third-party payment,but also go against to the stability of the entire financial market.Therefore,the supervision task of the Chinese government on third-party payment platforms is very urgent.Firstly,from the perspective of game analysis,this paper establishes a game matrix between two third-party payment institutions under unsupervised conditions,and analyzes the necessity of introducing government supervision.Secondly,the game model between the supervisory department and the payment institution is established.Through the static game under complete information and the dynamic game ESS analysis of incomplete information,it is pointed out that the main incentive for the payment institution to violate regulations is the huge extra income brought about by the violation;The probability of violation by payment institutions is mainly affected by the supervision costs and penalties of the regulatory authorities;raising the incentive evaluation of society for the compliance of payment institutions is beneficial to the compliance operations of payment institutions.At the same time,regulators should work to reduce regulatory costs and strengthen the supervision of third-party payments.Finally,on the basis of the game analysis conclusions and foreign regulatory experience,based on the status quo of China's third-party payment development,we put forward suggestions for improving the government supervision of third-party payment platforms in China:at the legislative level,we must actively improve related laws and establish the The legal status of the third-party payment supervision;It should develop the multi-government main body of "multi-institutionalin a centre".In terms of the regulatory model,it should be advancing with the times,innovating the existing regulatory model,and gradually turning to functional supervision.In terms of regulatory content,multi-pronged approaches,such as improving market access and exit mechanisms,strengthening the management system for customer preparations,and strengthening the supervision of money laundering and bank card cashing.Starting from regulatory safeguard measures,it is not only necessary to reasonably control the cost of government supervision,but also to increase the government's punishment for violations by payment institutions,and to strengthen the supervision of industry self-regulation and social supervision as well as information disclosure.