The Nature Of Property Rights, The Dispute Over Control Rights And Equity Incentives

This Equity incentive is widely used to solve agency problems,but China's implementation is later,the mechanism is not sound,and the development and application also exposed some problems,such as equity incentive is considered as "golden handcuffs" for executive welfare,and large shareholders use equity incentive to tunneling.China's listed companies have two different properties of state-owned and private property,and they have great difference in equity incentive.In addition to the nature of property rights,the actual control of the control of listed companies is a significant feature of Chinese listed companies,so this paper studied the ownership incentive under the dispute of different property rights.In this paper,the case study of the shanghai jiahua of state-owned private transformation,comparative analysis of the two equity incentive schemes before and after the change of the property rights of shanghai jiahua.It is found that state-owned listed companies and Non-state listed companies not only have great differences in governance level,but also have great differences in regulatory institutions,incentive income limit and assessment index,which affect the design motivation and equity incentive effect of the equity incentive plan of two listed companies.The results show that the equity incentive welfare of state-owned enterprises is serious,and the equity incentive of private enterprises is more effective.Therefore,it is suggested to speed up the reform of state-owned enterprises,the regulatory departments should adjust the design rules of equity incentive,enhance flexibility and improve the incentive rate.The dispute of control right may bring large shareholders' tunneling,and may further strengthen a supervisory role to management,which depends entirely on the judgment of the realization mechanism of the interests of large shareholders,so the design and incentive effect of equity incentive plan can not be separated from the dispute of control.However,currently scholars have less research on the debate of control and equity incentive,this duty makes up this gap.Shanghai jiahua also experienced the control of control,excluding other factors,analyzes the similarities and differences of ownership incentive schemes proposed by different controllers in the background of the same property right.It is found that the dispute of control can promote the design of equity incentive scheme,but there are the suspicion of " dew balance" incentive to consolidate control,the business performance is negative growth,and then explore its essence is tunneling.